And the reality is that people have these fantasies. The youth of the 1996-2000 team was acquired for the most part when the team was towards the bottom of the pack- Jeter, Pettitte, Rivera and Posada were all a product of the 1990-1994 development period. Guess what 1990-92 were awful years for the major league team. And even in 1993 when they started the resurgence they did it despite themselves- they were dieing for Maddux but he used them- so they went with Jimmy Key. They signed Danny Tartabull to a monster contracy

Thats cool, but I just disagreed with the concept that spending money on free agents made them worse. The only type A free agents that really were a disaster were Pavano, Giambi, and Karsay (if he was a type A). Mussina was a disappointment but considering free agent pitching, he was a success. I thought the Weaver deal was an smart move at first glance, especially considering the fact that Lilly’s motion frightened everybody so much. And like I said they have managed to win 90 games and make the playoffs with the free agent additions.

I agree with you about the right path, but I just think its more related to the change in the economic landscape following the 2002 CBA. These smaller teams have been subsidized by the Yankees (primarily) since that point. Which also allowed them to hold on to some of their young pitching by gamblng and buying out their arb years and maybe getting one of their fa years. That is dramatically different than pre-2002 when these teams would get ready to dump at the deadline and know that there were two or three teams that could do it. And you would actually see impact pitchers ages 28-33 being made affordable. There have also been a flood of new stadiums that have made certain teams more flexible in spending for young players.

But we can agree that their scouting and development from 2000-2005 were horrible.

You draft smart, use your resources to stock the system, dont overspend on aging vets and make the right prospect trades for in their prime talent.

My argument post-2001 was that the Yankees lagged in scouting/player development in general, not particularly in trades. I am sorry I wasn’t clearer.

I agree completely with your analysis. The players traded away post-2001 were the failed prospects of a bad scouting system. The Yanks swindled my Phillies out of Bobby Abreu for nothing more than Matt Smith and the dregs of their 2005 draft (C.J. Wilson, I’m looking at you).

But at the same time, they signed a large number of free agents in the 2000s, and most of them were A type under the old A/B/C Elias rankings. This cost the Yankees a great many draft picks, which did nothing to improve the already weak system.

Add in the fact that when you sign the /wrong/ free agents (Sheffield instead of Vlad, for instance), it negates the advantage you got by acquiring the right players (ARod, as you note), and you’re left with a system that treads water as the core ages.

As you said, “sometimes youth movements don’t work out,” but when they do, it’s with shrewd evaluation. I’m not so sure it’s “just bad luck.”

But that’s not really true either. David Wells and El Duque cost nothing, yes… they were free agents.

To get David Cone, we traded Marty Janzen, Jason Jarvis, and Mike Gordon. Janzen was high-ceiling 22 year old power righty; Jarvis and Gordon were mid-level pitching prospects (and Gordon was a lefty.) Janzen, in 1995, was probably comparable to Ian Kennedy, in terms of perceived value. Fernando Seguignol, who we dealt to get Wetteland, was a highly regarded former international signing who, at 19, had Jose Tabata-type buzz. To get Tino Martinez to replace Don Mattingly, we gave up Russ Davis and Sterling Hitchcock; Davis was an average defensive catcher who showed huge power hitting potential (73 HR in three minor league seasons), Hitchcock was a 24 year old lefty who had 121K in 168 ML innings with the Yanks and was considered one of the top 10-15 young pitchers in all of baseball at the time. To get Chuck Knoblauch, we gave up Cristian Guzman and Eric Milton (along with Brian Buchanan and Danny Mota), who were blue chippers on the levels of an Austin Jackson or a Joba Chamberlain… they were both ticketed as surefire stars. Clemens, of course, cost us David Wells (with Homer Bush, a young speedster), a lefty who had just come in third in the Cy Young balloting and pitched a perfect game for us, so it’s ludicrous to say we got Clemens for “nothing”.

Ultimately, The dynasty was constructed EQUALLY by three avenues: good internal promotions, wise free agent acquisitions, and targeting proven winners through trades by dealing away some of our minor league depth at the peak of it’s value. People love to talk about Andy Pettitte, Mo Rivera, and Ramiro Mendoza. Those three homegrown Yankee pitchers were only 3 out of dozens of pitching prospects we had in our farm system in the early-to-mid ’90s… the rest were dealt to get guys like Cone, Wetteland, Knoblauch, and Tino, guys who were proven winners and established producers.

When teams cannot sign their veterans who are becoming too costly, they now look to trade them, with the Cabrera and Santana situations being cases in point.

I don’t believe it’s usually prudent to trade multiple top tier prospects (and/or young, cost controlled veterans) for pitchers, even those who are as good as Santana (as an aside, I believe that trading for Beckett made more sense because he was younger and had a more durable body type). If the Yankees were going to trade Hughes (which I oppose), I would have much preferred that he be packaged for Cabrera.

I do, however, support trading lesser prospects for assets like Abreu, as well as trading veterans like Sheffield for prospects.

- Build like a low-payroll team.
- Spend on high-bonus picks, lock up players through arb and 1/2 years free agency
- Sign mediocre, short-term free agents to fill holes
- Sign the superstars to big time free agents.

If spent wisely, a $200 million payroll should win at least 105 games each year.