I have been following MLB since 1960, and I can’t think of a single “big spot” that occurred before the 7th inning. So for the index to even give a little weight to anything before the 7th inning just skews what it is we’re trying to actually measure.

I would claim that “clutchness” measures how a player does – pitcher or batter (and maybe even fielder as well) in a “big spot”. The problem then becomes one of defining what a “big spot” is.

I submit it is this:
- 7th inning or later
- The batter’s team is down 4 or fewer runs

I have considered the impact of runners on base. We could explore the relationship of runners on base to runs behind – thus, ostensibly, if the batter’s team is down, say, 2, and there are 2 or 3 men on base, that “big spot” would contain more pressure. But for now, I’m not going to include that.

I would further define a “productive plate appearances” as follows:
- A hit
- A walk (ie, Base on Balls, NOT HBP)
- A sac that scores a run
- A productive out, ie, one that moves runners into scoring position
- NOT an error
- NOT a HBP (since the batter generally has no control over that)
- NOT an unproductive out (K, any out that does not advance the runner(s))
- NOT a DP, UNLESS a runner is advanced who eventually comes in to score without the game ending in a loss in that inning.

Again, we could give weights to rank these productive plate appearances – anything that does not result in an out might be ranked higher than anything that does; anything that scores a run might rank higher than anything that does not. But I feel that just adds complexity which does not shed more light on what we are trying to measure – how much of the time does the player have a productive plate appearance in a big spot.

So, then, the clutch percentage would simply be:

# productive plate appearances in big spots/# of big spots

I claim this simple stat would accurately reflect a batter’s clutchness as well as any other.

I further claim that the very same stat could be used to measure a pitcher’s clutchness – with the understanding that the lower this ratio the MORE CLUTCH a pitcher is (whereas for a batter the opposite it true).

I further claim that this same stat could be measured for teams, BOTH from a hitting AND a pitching standpoint.

Finally, I suspect it could even measure a fielder’s clutchness, assuming there were a statistically significant number of fielding opportunities. That is, for a fielder, a “big spot” would have to have an additional condition – that the play should have involved them. This gets murky – for example, a bunt. Whether the catcher should have fielded it or the 3rd baseman or the pitcher is a judgement call. And where the ball should be thrown – get the lead runner at third? Get the sure out at first? – is also up for debate.

What is clear, however, is that this stat is much easier to track, much clearer in definition and, I claim, as much if not more accurate than the description of the Leverage Index you link to.

GV

He’s not nearly as horrible in big spots as some make him out to be (myself included at times), but he could most certainly be much better than he has been.

I often wonder how Arod would be perceived today if Dave Roberts got caught stealing in Game 4 of ’04 and the Yanks moved on to the WS. ARod might have been the ALCS MVP, instead he vanished in games 5-7 and for pretty much the rest of his Yankee playoff career.

It’s a little different for Alex, but it doesn’t take much to go from zero to hero. Tino Martinez was gawd-awful in the playoffs until his grand slammer in ’98. He got benched in ’96.

Damon was about 0 for 40 until his grand slam in game six of ’04. Now both players are considered clutch.

Bonds was awful in the playoffs with the Pirates and heard a lot of the same criticism ARod hears today. And even though the Giants lost to the Angels, Bonds (and some steroids) had a playoff run for the ages that year and everyone stopped talking about how he never hit in the clutch.

So hopefully this is not a permanent condition. But I think it’s definitely a current condition.

In that light, it doesn’t really seem fair to “dock” A-Rod points for failing to raise his level of performance even higher than that. I think it’s perfectly fair to reward, say, Manny Ramirez for doing it – his numbers are simply unreal. The same goes for Pujols. But you can laud one or two truly exceptional hitters without turning A-Rod into a goat; again, over his career he has performed just as well in high-leverage situations as low-leverage situations, and that’s still *really* damned good.

And we get so caught up in “leverage” and “the clutch” that we forget that what happens in “low leverage” situations (say, the first through third innings, when there’s no score) can also play a really big role in the game. I’d rather have someone perform well in *all* situations – as most elite baseball players, A-Rod included, do – than someone who is lesser the majority of the time, but does slightly better in situations that may or may not otherwise arise if those same players were better the rest of the time.

Clearly that wouldn’t really apply to someone like Manny, Pujols, or – arguably – Ortiz, but I think it’s fair to say that applies to a Morneau, Delgado, or Sheffield. Not that an .880-.900 OPS isn’t something to sneeze at, or something that isn’t valuable, but you’re still talking between 60 to 90 points of difference to A-Rod’s “base” performance, and that’s going to lead to more runs over the course of the season.

They won’t be distributed evenly, obviously, but I’ll take the player who will produce more runs over the course of the season than the player who doesn’t, since there’s certainly a higher chance that simply from producing a higher volume of runs, there will be a statistically better chance (however remote) of those runs impacting your team’s record more often than not.

Player – Low LI OPS / Medium LI OPS / High LI OPS (all career)

Morneau — .861 / .811 / .914
The Swedish Sheff — .884 / .925 / .938
Larry Wayne Jr. — .975 / .940 / .938
Delgado Del-got-it — .902 / .945 / .953
Vlad the Impaler — .922 / 1.000 / .963
Alexander Emmanuel — .972 / .960 / .977
David Orcheats — .936 / .909 / .990
Sexy Texy — .905 / .880 / 1.002
Manny Beating Manny — .983 / 1.015 / 1.017
Reggie Stocker — 1.026 / 1.080 / 1.037
Poo-Holes — 1.043 / 1.008 / 1.146

What do the stats “say”? That while ARod is probably no better or worse of a player in game situations of increased importance, many–perhaps most–of his peers actually improve their performance in those high-leverage situations, some quite significantly.

And for the record, his peers are the elite, middle of the order bats; that’s who he should be compared to. Defending ARod as being “clutch” by saying that his RISP OPS is 200 points better than the league average doesn’t mean much, because he’s supposed to be way better than league average; he’s a premier player and a significant part of our resource allocation strategy is committed to him being a great player in great moments. Matching up the statistical evidence with the anecdotal evidence, there’s a natural reason why many of these players would produce better outputs in high-leverage situations – namely, the game is structured strategically to be placed in their hands. ARod and Manny and Ortiz and Pujols come up countless times in their careers in late innings with runners on and a chance to get a hit that will determine the outcome of the game because the team and the lineup around those players is structured to give them those opportunities. ARod hasn’t proven to be consistently good in those situations, not as consistently good as his peers.

Then how come with someone like David Ortiz or Manny it works the other way.
There is a reason why A-Rod is look at in this way.