Archive for Analysis
How did Pettitte fare after high stress starts in 2009?
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Later on tonight, Andy Pettitte will make his final start of 2009, for better or worse. As you know, he’ll be working on three days’ rest for the first time since 2006, and many fans are concerned about how the 37-year-old will rebound on short rest. While his stats on three days’ rest are pretty good (3-1, 2.80 ERA in five career short rest starts in the playoffs), the data is so old and not indicative of anything that it might as well be recorded in hieroglyphics.
Instead of relying on those numbers, let’s take a look at how Pettitte fared on normal four days’ rest following what I’ll call “high stress outings” in 2009. By “high stress outings,” I mean starts in which Andy threw a lot of pitches while allowing lots of baserunners in not many innings. Think 5.1 IP, 9 H, 4 R, 3 BB kind of outings. Then, by looking at how he performed four days later, it’ll give us an approximation of what Pettitte will do tonight. It’s obviously not a perfect comparison, but it’s better than pretty much anything else we have right now.
Game Three over the weekend wasn’t kind to Andy, but he battled through six innings while putting eight men on base and letting four runners cross the plate. He threw 104 pitches, so it would definitely be considered a “high stress outing.” Let’s see how Pettitte rebounded from similar starts this year.
High Stress Outing: April 26th @ Boston: 6 IP, 6 H, 4 BB, 4 R, 116 pitches, -0.14 WPA
Next Start: May 1st vs Anaheim: 5.2 IP, 9 H, 4 BB, 5 R, 111 pitches, +0.02 WPA
HSO: May 18th vs Twins: 6.2 IP, 12 H, 1 BB, 4 R, 105 pitches, -0.03 WPA
NS: May 23rd vs Phillies: 7 IP, 5 H, 2 BB, 4 R, 114 pitches, -0.11 WPA
HSO: June 3rd vs Texas: 5 IP, 7 H, 6 BB, 4 R, 104 pitches, -0.17 WPA
NS: June 8th vs Tampa: 6 IP, 5 H, 3 BB, 3 R, 104 pitches, +0.06 WPA
HSO: June 25th @ Atlanta: 3.2 IP, 7 H, 3 BB, 6 R, 95 pitches, -0.23 WPA
NS: July 1st vs Seattle: 7 IP, 6 H, 1 BB, 2 R, 98 pitches, +0.17 WPA
HSO: July 6th vs Toronto: 6 IP, 5 H, 5 BB, 6 R, 109 pitches, -0.20 WPA
NS: July 11th @ Anaheim: 4.1 IP, 7 H, 2 BB, 6 R, 83 pitches, -0.32 WPA
HSO: August 21st @ Boston: 5 IP, 7 H, 2 BB, 7 R, 105 pitches, +0.05 WPA
NS: August 26th vs Texas: 7 IP, 5 H, 3 BB, 2 R, 103 pitches, +0.23 WPA
I was going to break it down start-by-start, but after recapping the first one, I gave up because all I would be doing is giving too much credit to the already small sample size. It wasn’t worth the time.
So anyway, that’s six instances this season when Andy really had to work hard to get outs, then had to come back and pitch four days later. In those six follow-up starts, Pettitte averaged 6.1 IP, 6.2 H, 2.5 BB, 3.7 R, 102.2 pitches, +0.05 WPA, which is not great, but it’s certainly serviceable. The good news that with exception of that July 1st start against the Mariners, all of the follow-up starts came against good offensive clubs, so the data isn’t too skewed.
Pettitte’s average start this year was 6.1 IP, 6.0 H, 2.4 BB, 3.2 R, 103 pitches, +0.05 WPA, which is ridiculously close to his average in those follow-up starts. The biggest difference is that he allowed half a run more following a real tough outing, which is probably just a BABIP thing since the number of baserunners and innings pitched are nearly identical. I have to say, I’m somewhat surprised by the results.
Of course, these starts come on regular four days’ rest in the middle of the season, not three day’s rest after Pettitte already has 219.2 IP on his left arm. We can arbitrarily dock him an inning and tack on another run, meaning we should expect 5+ innings and about 5 runs tonight, but that’s nothing more than guesswork.
What I wanted to see with this post is how Pettitte rebounded after a taxing start, and as you can see above, he generally didn’t suffer any sort of hangover. It’s far from a perfect analysis, but it’s much better than just assuming he’ll do bad for no other reason than because you have a bad feeling about it.
Photo Credit: Brian Kersey, UPI
How would the Yankees use the double switch?
Posted by: | CommentsFor the first time since June, the Yankees will be without the benefit of the designated hitter, a big part of their offense. That role has been Hideki Matsui’s this year, and he performed admirably, posting a .274/.367/.509 line across 526 plate appearances. He didn’t play an inning of outfield all season, though, bringing into question his role for the next three games.
It appears that Girardi has ruled out the possibility of starting Matsui in the outfielld. Carig reports that Matsui could play the outfield in a double switch situation, which would place him in the outfield for the first time since June 15, 2008. Yet there seems to be only one scenario where a double switch would make any sense.
The double switch involves a manager substituting a position player for the pitcher, and a pitcher for a position player. This only works if 1) the pitcher’s spot is due up in the next inning, and 2) the position player leaving the game isn’t due up before the pitcher’s spot. This creates a problem for the Yankees, because their lineup will probably look like this:
1. Jeter
2. Damon
3. Teixeira
4. Rodriguez
5. Posada
6. Cano
7. Cabrera
8. Swisher
9. Pitcher
Cabrera and Swisher at the bottom of that lineup make the double switch tough when it involves Matsui. If, say, Cano makes the last out, the pitcher would be due up but two of the double switch candidates are due up first. All Girardi could do at that point is to sub the relief pitcher for Johnny Damon, which staves off the pitcher’s spot by only two batters. If the Yanks put two men on base in the next inning, the pitcher comes up any way and you’ve just pointlessly lost Damon’s bat.
If Cabrera makes the last out it creates another tough situation. In a double switch the pitcher would come in for Cabrera, meaning the substitution would have to play center field — no way that Swisher or Damon does at this point. That means Gardner, who would hit after Swisher to start the inning. Unless you absolutely needed the reliever for multiple innings, wouldn’t it just make sense to pinch hit Matsui in the nine spot and call on another pitcher for the next inning?
It could make sense if Swisher makes the last out of the inning. Matsui would then sub for the pitcher and take over in right field. He would also lead off the next inning. But in that scenario, if the game is close, Girardi would probably pinch run Gardner for Matsui if he got on. At that point he’d be better off just pinch hitting with Matsui, since the move commits to less. Then if Damon makes the last out of that inning, you could insert Hideki into left and leave the pitcher in the two hole. You could do that in the double switch scenario too, I suppose.
Going through double switch situations is something new for us fans of AL teams, and it’s certainly an exercise. The problem in doing this is that to double switch with Matsui would hamper the defense. Straight pinch hitting assignments could work better, unless there’s a serious lineup alignment issue. Then, and only then, should Girardi double switch. If he doesn’t need the reliever for multiple innings, straight pinch hitting is the way to go.
The one scenario I can see this working is in a straight pinch hitting situation. If Matsui pinch hits for the pitcher and Damon makes the final out of that inning, Girardi could send Matsui out to left and insert the new pitcher into the two spot.
I’m sure I’ve missed a few scenarios (and might have even botched some). This is where I love the comments.
The at-bat that sealed the game
Posted by: | CommentsFor seven innings last night, CC Sabathia kept the Yankees in the game. After a rough first inning he settled down, hurt only by a pair of Chase Utley home runs. But, because he’d done such a good job of keeping the Phillies off the base paths, they were both solo home runs. Unfortunately, with Cliff Lee in his groove, it would take a serious offensive effort just to make up those two runs.
What the Yankees needed was for the bullpen to keep it a two-run game so that maybe, just maybe the offense could pull off a late-inning rally. That did not happen. Phil Hughes walked the first two batters he faced, and while Damaso Marte did his job, David Robertson failed to record the inning’s final out without allowing the Phillies to extend the lead.
His first opponent was Jayson Werth. With a righty on righty matchup, this is the guy the Yanks wanted to retire. Robertson started him with a fastball that ended up a bit low for ball one. To the fastball he went, and he missed three straight times for a four-pitch walk. But did he really miss? As pitchf/x records it, the second and third pitches of the at-bat were strikes. The second pitch was debatable, hanging up at the top of the zone, a place where umpires don’t always call strikes. But the third pitch was right there, a 93 mph fastball that came in a bit high, but certainly within the zone’s confines.
Robertson then missed badly for ball four, a fastball low, loading the bases for Raul Ibanez. Girardi could have gone to Phil Coke, but with three righties following Ibanez, and considering Robertson’s favorable splits against lefties, it was probably the right move to leave him in the game. Robertson then went to work, and he set up Ibanez nicely.
The first pitch he kissed the low, outside corner with a fastball for strike one. He then tossed another low fastball that missed the bottom of the zone to even the count. Keeping the ball low again, Robertson placed his third pitch, a 93 mph fastball, on the inside part of the plate for strike two. With Ibanez down in the count, he had to be prepared for the curveball, but Jorge and Robertson went back to the fastball, this one high and outside. It was a nice change of pace, and that’s going to get a swing and miss sometimes. Ibanez, though, managed to foul it off.
With the count still 1-2, and with Ibanez having seen four straight fastballs, Posada and Robertson went to the curve. It missed by a decent margin, though, evening the count at 2-2. I’m not sure if they were going for the swing and miss, or just poor contact, but again Posada called for the curveball and set up on the low outside corner.
Robertson delivered, and Ibanez bounced one through the hole on the right side for a two-run single that opened up the game for the Phillies. The pitch was supposed to stay away, but as you can see below, Posada had to move his glove towards the middle of the plate. That allowed Ibanez to get enough of his bat head on it to get it into the outfield.
Just how much of the plate did that curve get? The pitch sequence strike zone plot from Brooks Baseball shows us.
It was low and kind of away, but not where Robertson and Posada wanted it. It was still a decent pitch, but not a great pitch. Ibanez, a good hitter, did what he could with it. Cano, playing a bit to his right, had no shot.
Had Robertson placed that pitch just slightly further outside, perhaps Ibanez would have bounced it right to Cano. He might have even swung and missed. But, because the ball was towards the middle of the plate Ibanez could handle it, and while it wasn’t the difference in the game it certainly changed the tone. Instead of being down two with six outs remaining, the Yankees were down four with the bottom of their lineup due up in the eighth.
“A game of inches” is a cliche for a reason. Robertson had done a good job setting up Ibanez, but made a small mistake on one pitch and it ended up costing them big. It’s the nature of the game, and it happens to the best of them. Just ask CC Sabathia who, after throwing three good pitches to Chase Utley in the sixth, left a fastball right over the middle of the plate.
After all this, I can’t help but wonder how the game would have unfolded if Robertson got even one of those strike calls against Werth. If he’d retired him, our moods might be different right now.
Open Thread: Who have been the most valuable Yankees? (Part III)
Posted by: | CommentsA third of the way through the season, I took at look at which players were contributing the most the Yankees in terms of wins over replacement, or WAR. We’ve been using that stat for a while, so I’m sure you’ve all seen it. It encompasses offense and defense relative to position, so it’s usefulness is apparent.
Two-thirds of the way through the season I checked back in, and found that for the most part, there wasn’t much movement up top. Now that the regular season is over, let’s take a look one more time at which players were most valuable to the team in 2009. First, the pitchers:
Top Five Pitchers
- CC Sabathia, 6.0 WAR
- Andy Pettitte, 3.3
- AJ Burnett, 3.1
- Phil Hughes, 2.2
- Mariano Rivera, 2.0
For comparison’s sake, Zack Greinke was far and away the most valuable pitcher in baseball this year at 9.4 WAR (Justin Verlander and Tim Lincecum tied for second at 8.2 WAR). The last time a pitcher was that dominant was 2004, when Randy Johnson picked up 9.9 WAR. It’s pretty amazing to think that Phil Hughes was more valuable than Mo this year, though Phil did get a boost from his half-dozen starts. Joba Chamberlain (1.5) and Al Aceves (1.2) were the only other pitchers in the staff worth over a win. You can see the team’s full leaderboard here.
As a whole, the Yankee pitching staff was worth a total of 18.6 WAR, good for fifth best in the AL.
Top Five Position Players
- Derek Jeter, 7.4 WAR
- Mark Teixeira, 5.2
- Alex Rodriguez, 4.6
- Robinson Cano, 4.3
- Jorge Posada, 4.0
The most valuable position player in the game this year was … wait for it … Ben Zobrist at 8.5 WAR. Albert Pujols was right behind him (8.4), and Joe Mauer behind him (8.2). Those three plus Chase Utley were the only players in baseball this year more valuable than the Cap’n. Nick Swisher wasn’t too far behind Posada at 3.7 WAR, but after that it dropped off a bit. Here’s the team leaderboard.
Yankee position players were far and away the most valuable in the league this year, clocking in at a collective 38.3 WAR. Tampa Bay was second at 34.1, and no other team cracked the 30 WAR plateau. That’s domination, homes.
* * *
Here’s your open thread for the evening. The Eagles and Redskins are your Monday night game, and you’ve also got the Rangers and Islanders in action in separate contests as well. Feel free to talk about whatever you like, just make sure you follow the guidelines and be cool to each other.
Oh, and there’s not going to be a DotF tonight. Surprise plays the late game, so I’m going to just recap it tomorrow with tomorrow’s game. If you must know what happened, here’s the league scoreboard.
Rethinking Santana and Sabathia, again
Posted by: | CommentsIn the winter of 2007-2008, when River Ave. Blues was still in its blog infancy, the hot topic of the Hot Stove League was Johan Santana. The Twins were gearing up to trade their lefty ace, and the Yankees were deeply involved in the negotiations.
As the winter dragged on, we staked out a position deemed extreme by many — but not Yanks’ GM Brian Cashman. “Save the Big Three,” we proclaimed, as it became clear that any Johan Santana deal would probably include some combination of Phil Hughes and Ian Kennedy along with other top prospects or Major League contributors. The money, we argued, would be better spent on CC Sabathia a year later when the big man hit free agency. Plus, we reasoned, the Yanks wouldn’t have to pay twice for CC, first in prospects and then in dollars, as they would for Santana.
When all was said and done that winter, our position held the day, but it was not without controversy. Throughout 2008 and even into 2009, a debate raged among Yankee fans over that non-trade, and when the Yanks missed the playoffs in 2008 for the first time since 1994, Cashman and the anti-trade faction received its fair share of criticism.
Yet, last winter, the pieces fell into place. The Yanks landed CC Sabathia, and this year, that signing has paid off in a big way. CC took home MVP honors after the ALCS, and after posting tremendous numbers this season, Sabathia has powered his way through three playoff starts. It’s been wine and roses for the Yanks and CC this year.
With the Yanks gearing up to face the Phillies in the World Series, let’s take a look at how those pieces from the Santana trade are doing. I’m going to assume that the most popular iteration of the trade — Phil Hughes, Ian Kennedy and Melky Cabrera for Johan Santana — would have gotten the deal done. The Yanks probably would have thrown in a fourth lesser prospect as well.
Phil Hughes
Still just 23 years old, Hughes has been one of the most heralded young arms in recent Yankee history. He made his debut in 2007 and threw admirably as one of the youngest starters in the league. His 2008, however, was a complete wash. He started the season 0-4 with an ERA of 9.00 and then missed May, June, July and August with a variety of injuries. By the end of 2008, Yankee fans were wondering about the hype, and many rued not trading Hughes when his stock was high.
This year, though, has been an utter revelation for Yankee fans and Phil Hughes. He made a few spot starts in place of Chien-Ming Wang and flashed some decent stuff, but the youngster really came into his own upon moving into the bullpen. As the 8th inning bridge to Mariano, Hughes went 5-1 with a 1.44 ERA in 44 games. In 51.1 innings, he walked just 13 and struck out 65. He put up a 22.7 RAR and a 2.2 WAR out of the bullpen, and without Hughes in the 8th, the Yanks’ season would have played out much differently.
Melky Cabrera
For Melky, 2008 was a setback. He was the subject of many trade rumors and didn’t play well at all. He hit .249/.301/.341 and lost his starting job to Brett Gardner by early August. This year, though, with increased competition from Gardner, Melky responded in turn. Although he faded a bit down the stretch, Melky hit .274/.336/.416 with a career-best in home runs (13), doubles (28) and OPS+ (97). In the ALCS, he went 9 for 23 with four RBI and three walks. At 25, Melky has 2148 Major League plate appearances under his belt and could yet turn into an adequate offensive outfielder.
Ian Kennedy
Similar to Hughes, Kennedy had a terrible 2008. He also went 0-4 with a gaudy 8.17 ERA and found himself demoted after not pitching poorly. To make matters worse, he flashed an attitude unappreciated by many in New York. This year, he had a strong start at AAA but came down with an aneurysm in his arm. He made a triumphant return to the Majors and threw an inning against Anaheim in mid-September. He is currently throwing in the Arizona Fall League where he has allowed five earned runs in 11.1 innings but has a 13:1 K:BB ratio. He will probably factor into the Yanks’ 2010 plans.
Johan Santana
The centerpiece of the deal landed in New York after all but in Queens and not the Bronx. He has been a bright spot amidst a dismal Mets team. With the Mets, he has gone 29-16 in 59 starts. He has a 2.79 ERA in the NL and has struck 352 while walking 109 in 401 innings. His K/9 IP in the NL is 1.6 strike outs lower than it was in the AL. This season, his velocity started trending downward, and he missed the final six weeks of the season after undergoing surgery to remove bone chips in his arm. The Mets still owe him at least $98.5 million over the next four seasons or $118 million over five.
Late last week, Cashman spoke with John Harper of the Daily News about this very topic. “When we added David Cone from Toronto,” Cashman said “we were a piece away at the time. But when Santana became available, in my opinion we weren’t a piece away yet. So I told ownership, ‘Listen, six months really isn’t a long time to wait – though it turned out to be a long time for me, to be honest – and if we can have the patience and discipline, I can’t guarantee you we’ll be able to get Sabathia, but think about what our organization will look like if we can add him and keep these other assets.’”
And so today, those assets are still in place. The Yankees are playing the World Series with CC Sabathia, Phil Hughes and Melky Cabrera primed to contribute. Although Ian Kennedy hasn’t yet been what we expected and Melky has hit some development roadblocks over the last few years, the Yankees are right where they expected to be when Cashman turned down the Santana offer. I certainly think it’s worked out nicely for them. Do you?
How were the Yankees assembled?
Posted by: | CommentsA new addition to my RSS reader is a blog called The Sports PhD. He brings some interesting ideas to the table, and some of them I’ve already riffed on, like the best worst hitters in the playoffs. Today he goes over how the Philadelphia Phillies were assembled. The obvious next step is to see how the Yankees put together their squad. I’ll do it in the same style as Sports PhD.
| 1B | Mark Teixeira | Signed as a Free Agent from Angels | 2009 |
| 2B | Robinson Cano | Amateur Free Agent | 2001 |
| SS | Derek Jeter | 1st Round Draft Pick | 1992 |
| 3B | Alex Rodriguez | Traded by Rangers | 2004 |
| RF | Nick Swisher | Traded by White Sox | 2009 |
| CF | Melky Cabrera | Amateur Free Agent | 2001 |
| LF | Johnny Damon | Signed as a Free Agent from Red Sox | 2005 |
| C | Jorge Posada | 24th Round Draft Pick | 1990 |
| DH | Hideki Matsui | Signed as Free Agent from Japan | 2003 |
| SP | CC Sabathia | Signed as Free Agent from Brewers | 2009 |
| SP | A.J. Burnett | Signed as Free Agent from Blue Jays | 2009 |
| SP | Andy Pettitte | 22nd Round Draft Pick* | 1990 |
| SU | Phil Hughes | 1st Round Draft Pick | 2004 |
| CL | Mariano Rivera | Amateur Free Agent | 1990 |
*Pettitte was a draft and follow, drafted in 1990 but signed in May of 91.
The Phillies assembled their team with 6 through the draft, 1 Rule 5 player, 1 amateur free agent, 4 trades, and 4 free agency signings. I added a few more players for the Yanks comparison, but they added 4 through the amateur draft, 3 through amateur free agency, 2 via trade, 4 through traditional free agency, and 1 by Japanese free agency. That looks like a good breakdown to me. The Yankees had an advantage in Latin America scouting, and it paid off. That’s the biggest difference between them and the Phillies, who had better amateur drafts — partly because they finished worse than the Yanks in most years.
Hopefully, this won’t be the last Yankees/Phillies comparison we see in the coming weeks.
Production from aging players a Yankee advantage
Posted by: | CommentsIn the course of my work for this site, I read a lot about baseball. A lot. Reading a wide swath of material sparks ideas for posts, but sometimes I find an article that says it all. I wish I’d come up with the topic myself, and consider writing a full-on post about it, but the original author made the point so completely and so perfectly that there’s no point. B-R founder Sean Forman has a post up on the NY Times Bats blog about the Yankees and their age-defying team. Please, just read it. I will, however, provide a quote or two to demonstrate the awesomeness of the post:
“Andy Pettite* was the only pitcher this year over the age of 34 to throw 190 innings of above average baseball.”
* Forman’s spelling error, not mine.
His conclusion is also on the money:
Taken together, no team before the Yankees has had four players aged 35 or older hit for an OPS+ of more than 120. Only three teams, (the 1999 Orioles, the 1998 Padres, and the 1994 Tigers) have had three each. The conventional sabermetric wisdom is that betting on so many older players to perform at a high level is almost certain to lead to disappointing results, but the Yankees have made it work and none of their veterans show any signs of slowing down any time soon.
If I could reproduce the entire thing here, I would. But since I can’t, just go read the post.
Where did Phil Hughes’ curveball go?
Posted by: | CommentsLike most (all?) of you guys, I spent my Sunday evening watching Phil Hughes pitch part of the 8th inning in the Yankees’ series clinching win over the Twins. And also like most of you, I was waiting for Hughes to throw either Denard Span or Orlando Cabrera a curveball, a curveball that ultimately never came. In fact, just 3 (3!) of the 59 pitches Hughes threw in the ALDS were curveballs, that’s it. This wasn’t the first time I found myself wondering if St. Phil was ever going to break out Uncle Charlie, and it seemed like I was waiting for it more and more as the season progressed.
Since your memory can deceive you (”Memory can change the shape of a room; it can change the color of a car. And memories can be distorted. They’re just an interpretation, they’re not a record, and they’re irrelevant if you have the facts,” said the guy in Memento), I decided to turn to good ol’ PitchFX and dig up the facts. First things first, let’s take a look at Hughes’ pitch selection this season. Remember to click any chart in this, or pretty much any RAB post, for a larger view.
As you probably expected, Hughes went fastball heavy once he shifted to the bullpen, as he should. There’s no point messing around with your third or fourth best pitch as a reliever, and you can clearly see that his velocity spiked after the move. As for how much he was throwing each pitch as the season progressed, well that graph comes after the jump.
Mariano’s pitch sequences and game theory
Posted by: | CommentsThis is a nerdy subject, so I’ll keep it short and link-heavy. With pitch data freely available, we’re going to start seeing Game Theory used to analyze pitcher-batter matchups. Tommy at Beyond the Box Score touched on this earlier this week, and it’s a good read on pitch type game theory. Today at The Baseball Analysts, Dave Allen looks at Mariano Rivera’s pitch sequences. But, because Marino throws only one pitch, this sequencing deals with location rather than pitch type. An amazing non-game-theory note: Mo is insanely good when throwing to his glove side. Many pitchers have trouble controlling pitches on that side. Allen goes on to show how Mo fares when throwing inside to a lefty after an outside pitch, inside to a righty after an inside pitch, and so on.
As we know, Mo dominates lefties. He’s not quite as good against righties, and he’s particularly bad when going inside after an outside pitch — and is also not quite as good when going inside-outside. Tom Tango runs with that. In most cases with Game Theory, he says, we need to take the batter into consideration, because each batter has different strengths and weaknesses. With the outside-inside sequence, though, the difference is too pronounced to chalk it up to poor choices to certain batters. Mo throws this sequence 37 percent of the time (as in, throws an outside pitch 37 percent of the time after he throws an inside pitch). He would do well to cut down on that. Mo fares best against righties when going with the outside-outside sequence.
Just how long can you continue to throw righties outside cutters? I’m not sure. This is where longer pitch sequences would be helpful. For instance, if Mo goes outside-outside-inside, does he fare well? Or is that the sequence that hurts him the most? After all, he went inside after an outside pitch, which for him produces the worst result. But just prior to that he went outside after an outside. This also raises the issue of whether these sequences cover multiple batters. In other words, if Mo strikes out a righty with an inside cutter and opens the next righty with an outside one, is that counted as an inside-outside combination? Or are the sequences limited to single plate appearances? I would think you’d produce a bit of noise if you overlapped batters. Better to stick to single-batter sequences for these analyses.
This is the type of analysis that gets me excited. Even non-stat-heads can enjoy pitch sequencing and Game Theory. It’s an attempt to break down the most fundamental game in baseball, that between the pitcher and batter. Analysis doesn’t get any better than that.
The perfect use of WPA
Posted by: | CommentsIn baseball’s endless search for new ways to measure the game, we’ve recently seen the development of WPA. Using historical data, it tracks the odds a team has of winning a game at any given time, based on run differential, outs, and base situation. It has its flaws, but it does serve one purpose: it captures the essence of a game. Tom Tango examines this using a painful example, Ichiro’s walk-off. With two outs in the bottom of the ninth, WPA gave the Yanks an over-95-percent chance to win the game. Mike Sweeny’s double reduced that to 85.8 percent, and Ichiro made up all the difference. Tango also notes the general fan reaction, which makes sense after such an improbably turn around.
This feeds in nicely with the discussion in the Dominance Factors thread. The purpose of WPA is not to evaluate a player’s performance. It is to show the ebbs and flows of a game. Used for this purpose, it’s a wonderful stat. Used for others, it can mislead.
By request, the graph from that night:
From FanGraphs.
