Archive for Analysis
Thoughts on the economics of buying the World Series
Posted by: | CommentsWhen the Yankees won the World Series two weeks ago, the team set a rather dubious record. No longer were the 2007 Boston Red Sox the most expensive team ever to win baseball’s championship. With an estimated payroll around the $201 million mark, the 2009 Yankees shattered the previous record by nearly $60 million.
Of course, with these numbers as irrefutable proof of some devious Yankee scheme to take over baseball, analysts and fans outside of the city have accused the Yankees of buying a World Series championship. The economics of baseball, they say, are broken, and the Yankees are the prime example of it. In New York, we finger teams such as the Marlins ($36 million) who pocket nearly as much in revenue sharing as they pay their team as the real economic villains of baseball, but that just might be wishful thinking.
So for the first post in a series I plan to unveil as the off-season goes on, let’s explore the Yankees’ spending. In an article in the Wall Street Journal, sports economist and Smith University professor Andrew Zimbalist states that the Yankees did not buy a World Series. Noting that 20 of baseball’s 30 teams have made the playoffs since 2004, Zimbalist says that payroll accounts for only approximately 15-30 percent of a team’s success. The other factors, he writes, “include front office smarts, good team chemistry, player health, effective drafting and player development, intelligent trades, a manager’s in-game decision-making, luck, and more.” Many of those factors are related to wealth, but more on that later this off-season.
Even if the Yankees’ payroll helped them this year, Zimbalist says, it might handicap them in the future:
Imperfect though it may be, baseball has a system, and the Yankees play by its rules. Its success this year depended significantly on the acquisition of pitchers A.J. Burnett and C.C. Sabathia, along with first baseman Mark Teixeira. But the Yankees did not sign these players to one-year contracts (though the team did sign pitcher Andy Pettitte to a one-year deal).
Mr. Sabathia was great in 2009, but he is signed through 2015 when he will be 36 years old; Mr. Burnett through 2013 when he’ll be 36; and Mr. Teixeira through 2016 when he’ll be 37. Many of the team’s other stars are also signed to long-term contracts. Third baseman Alex Rodriguez is signed through 2017 when he will be 42 and catcher Jorge Posada through 2011 when he’ll be 40.
It’s possible that the positive correlation between payroll and success the Yankees experienced this year will turn into an inverse correlation. After all, player performance tends to wane with age. But these players have contracts that require the Yankees to increase their annual pay in the years ahead. Those salaries will weigh on the team’s ability to acquire other players.
As you chew on those statements and the aging horrors that may await us, take a peek at this rough sketch of reinvestment strategies among baseball teams. Khoi Vinh of the blog Subtraction has explored the way baseball teams in 2009 reinvested their 2008 earnings on the field and found that the Yanks’ reinvestment rates were near the top and that, especially in the playoffs, reinvestment rates determined success (and winning percentage). Of the eight playoff teams, none reinvested a larger percent of their earnings than the Yankees did, and no other team, obviously, reached that 11-win mark.
And so I leave you with some initial thoughts. Maybe the Yankees’ spending came as close to guaranteeing a World Series win as is possible within the framework of baseball’s economics, but the team may pay a price for it later. Furthermore, the Yanks are simply playing by the rules of the economic game, and if the rest of baseball thinks it is broken, they will have to fix it. For decades, though, baseball has tried to bring down the Yankees, and nothing has succeeded. I wouldn’t put money on an economic sea change any time soon.
What Went Wrong: Robbie Cano with RISP
Posted by: | CommentsOver the next week or so, we’ll again break down what went wrong and what went right for the 2009 Yankees. The series this year will be much more enjoyable than the last.
In many ways, Robinson Cano’s 2009 season was the finest of his career. He rebounded from a substandard 2008 campaign to hit .320-.352-.520, setting career highs in games played (161), hits (204), runs scored (103), doubles (48), homers (25), and OPS+ (129). His 331 total bases were fourth most in the league, just 13 behind right-side-of-the-infieldmate and league leader Mark Teixeira. Unfortunately, it wasn’t all good news for Cano in 2009, as he struggled immensely when runners were in scoring position.
Robbie hit just .207-.242-.332 in those spots this season, easily the worst performance with RISP of his career. There were 247 individual runners in scoring position for Cano in 2009, yet he drove in just 55 of them (not including himself four times on homeruns), or 22.3%. For comparison’s sake, Teixeira drove in 70 of 257 runners in scoring position, or 27.2%. It’s only a 4.9% difference and that might not seem like much, but with 250+ chances, that’s more than a twelve run swing.
Ironically enough, Cano has all the tools you’d want to see in a guy batting in RBI situations. He’s got a gorgeous swing and makes contact so easily that he rarely strikes out (he struck out in just 9.9% of his plate appearances last year, ninth best in baseball). He hits the ball to all fields with authority, and he straight up murders fastballs (.328 AVG off them in 2009, 1.59 fastball runs above average per 100 pitches according to FanGraphs). Sure, you would like him to work the count a little better, but we saw earlier this morning that Cano excels at swinging early in the count. It’s in his DNA, he’s just not ever going to be a very patient hitter.
If there’s any good news in all of this, it’s that Cano had an unsustainably low .210 BABIP with RISP in 2009. His career BABIP is .324, so we’re talking about a huge difference here. Working backwards, Cano “unlucked” out of 17 hits with RISP this year because of his abnormally low BABIP (assuming he would have had his career BABIP in those spots), and those 17 extra hits would have pushed his batting line to a much more respectable .299-.328-.434 (assuming they all would have been singles) with men on second and/or third.
Cano admitted during the season that his struggles with RISP got to him, and you could clearly see that he was pressing in those spots as the season wore on. He’s human, it happens. The offseason is probably the best thing for him, because he gets to go home and clear his head, then come into camp with a fresh start next spring. His performance with runners in scoring position has nowhere to go but up, and that’s exciting.
Photo Credit: Jim McIsaac, Getty Images
What Went Right: The Bullpen Makeover
Posted by: | CommentsOver the next week or so, we’ll again break down what went wrong and what went right for the 2009 Yankees. The series this year will be much more enjoyable than the last.
The Yankees came into 2009 feeling good about their bullpen. After all, the same cast of characters posted the seventh lowest ERA (3.79), second lowest FIP (3.82), second best strikeout rate (8.66 K/9), and tenth best walk rate (3.53 BB/9) in the league last year. Unfortunately, that group of relievers was unable to repeat that performance in the first month of this season. Their FIP in April was awful (5.41) and their ERA even worse (6.46), and it was a major reason why the team was in third place with a negative run differential on May 1st.
Thankfully, the Yanks had enough bullpen depth to not just replace one or two pieces, but to make wholesale changes. The first step in the makeover came on April 25th, when Phil Hughes was summoned from Triple-A to take over for the injured Chien-Ming Wang. Al Aceves replaced the overmatched Anthony Claggett on May 5th, and David Robertson took the place of the injured Brian Bruney three weeks later. Edwar Ramirez and his 33 baserunners allowed (6 homer!) in 17.1 IP was banished to the minors mid-May, and Jose Veras was mercifully designated for assignment a little later on.
After allowing three earned runs or less in five of his seven starts, Hughes shifted to the bullpen in early June to make way for Wang. He became the primary setup man to Mariano Rivera in short order, allowing everyone else in the bullpen to settle into roles more suitable for their skills. Hughes held opponents to a .172-.228-.228 batting line as a reliever, posting a ridiculous 65-13 K/BB ratio and an unfathomable 1.83 FIP after moving to the bullpen.
Aceves, meanwhile, became Joe Girardi’s jack of all trades. He was used in long relief, short relief, in matchup situations, you name it. He allowed less than a baserunner per inning, and his 80.2 IP as a reliever was the most by a Yankee since Scott Proctor’s 100.2 IP back in 2006. Aceves effectively bridged the middle innings gap from the starter to Phil Hughes all by himself.
Most teams would be happy with a pair of guys like Hughes and Aceves in their bullpen, but the Yankees didn’t stop there. Rookie David Robertson developed from promising prospect into a bullpen force, leading all American League pitchers by striking out 12.98 batters per 9 IP (the second place guy, Joakim Soria, was more than a full strikeout behind him).
Once all of the new pieces were in place, the Yankee bullpen went from weakness in April to strength the rest of the way. They finished the year with a solid 3.91 ERA, and placed second in the league in strikeout rate (8.44 K/9) and third in walk rate (3.46 BB/9). The names had to be changed, but Girardi’s bullpen once again finished the season as one of the strongest in the game.
Photo Credits: Getty Images, Reuters Pictures, AP
What Went Right: Gardbrera
Posted by: | CommentsOver the next week or so, we’ll again break down what went wrong and what went right for the 2009 Yankees. The series this year will be much more enjoyable than the last.
Mid-way through the 2007 season, it became apparent that Johnny Damon was no longer a viable option in centerfield for the Yankees. The team was somewhat up a creek without a paddle, as Damon still had two-and-a-half years left on his contract, and they had to turn to the unproven Melky Cabrera full-time in one of the most important positions on the field.
In 2008, Yankee centerfielders hit just .261-.320-.391, which represented the fifth lowest OBP and seventh lowest IsoP in the league. Furthermore, the group’s defense didn’t make up for their offense shortcomings, as they posted a collective +1.9 UZR/150. Melky got the lion’s share of the work in center (67.5% of the total innings), but he was demoted to the minors in mid-August after a 300 plate appearance stretch of futility in which he hit .227-.277-.280.
After flirting with various trade scenarios in the offseason, the Yankees came into Spring Training this past February with the same cast of centerfield characters as last year. Most (myself included) figured a mid-season trade for a centerfielder was in order. Instead, both Melky and Brett Gardner excelled in camp (Melky hit .349-.408-.508, Gardner .379-.446-.621), and the Yanks started the season with a somewhat unconventional platoon in the middle outfield spot.
Across the board, the performance in centerfield improved in 2009. The Gardbrera duo (plus a two game cameo from Jerry Hairston Jr.) hit .273-.338-.400, as Melky once again carried most of the load. Not only was the offensive upgrade welcome, but the defense also improved immensely thanks to Gardner. The team’s UZR/150 in center jumped to +7.5, third best in the AL. The league average offense and well-above average defense gave the Yankees the most production out of the centerfield position since Bernie Williams was in his heyday.
Photo Credit: Jim McIsaac, Getty Images
Valuing Chien-Ming Wang and Sergio Mitre
Posted by: | CommentsThe Yankees have the resources to take on a greater amount of risk than most teams. A misplaced $5 million might seriously hamper a smaller market team, but the Yankees — and the Red Sox, as evidenced by Brad Penny and John Smoltz — can take on a reclamation project and hope for the best. They did this in 2003, signing Jon Lieber after he underwent Tommy John surgery in 2002. They rehabbed him on their dime, and it paid off when he came back strong in 2004. So when it comes to Chien-Ming Wang’s contract situation, there are no givens. The Yankees can afford to do what they think will most benefit the team.
As Mike wrote this morning, Wang is no stranger to shoulder injuries. “The bottom line is that for the third time in eight years, the righthander missed a significant portion of the season with a shoulder issue.” This has to make the team wary. Wang will be arbitration eligible for the third time this winter, having made $4.5 million in 2009. If the Yankees tender him a contract, he’ll make at least that, and because of his service time he could get a bump to $5 million. Let’s go with that latter number, just to make things easy.
The question facing the Yankees is whether that $5 million is worth it to keep Wang around. It’s not just his salary for the 2010 season, when he’ll pitch half a season at the most, but also the price for keeping him under team control for his final arbitration-eligible season in 2011. There are alternatives; the Yankees could decline to tender Wang a contract and then sign him at a lower price. They would then be able to offer him arbitration after the 2010 season for the final time. For the sake of this argument, let’s assume that if the Yankees non-tender Wang, he’ll take his services elsewhere. Tendering him means paying $5 million for 2010.
This is the Yankees, so $5 million might not seem like a lot. There’s risk involved, yes, and chances are that the Yankees would have to pay more than $5 million for one of the other risky starters out there. Those would include Ben Sheets, Erik Bedard, and Rich Harden, and they would presumably be able to pitch the whole season, whereas Wang won’t be ready until July. Still, all three of those pitchers present a large risk. Wang will be cheaper, and the Yankees know him better than the other three. It seems that if they’re going the risky starter route, Wang’s their man.
Here’s a question I’ve been pondering regarding Wang’s status. Commenter Taz got it brewing in my mind when he asked, “Does anyone else think it’s ridiculous for the Yankees to exercise $1.25 mil on Mitre of the 6.59 ERA when pretty much any scrub from the minors would offer the same ability?” He says he’d rather put that money towards keeping Wang and replace Mitre with said scrub. Mitre’s $1.25 million is just a quarter of Wang’s projected salary, but every little bit helps, right?
First, to the issue of Mitre being a scrub. No one could be impressed with what they saw from Mitre during his tenure in pinstripes. He had one stellar start against the White Sox, but other than that he was shaky at best and downright terrible at worst. His defense failed him at times, but he could never pick up for them. It seemed like he was always making a bad situation worse. That infuriates fans, so it’s no wonder why Mitre has few supporters. Still, there is hope that he can provide value for the Yankees in 2010.
Mitre underwent Tommy John surgery in July of 2008. A year and six days after the surgery, he made his return. That’s a short span for a Tommy John patient. The normal recovery time is 12 to 18 months, and there are many stories of players who didn’t come back quite as strong at first, but who later recovered. Yet even if he does recover, I’ve heard the argument go, Mitre is just a scrub anyway. That I do not believe is totally accurate. In 2007, Mitre’s last season before the surgery, he had a 3.98 FIP, 4.34 tRA, and posted a 2.6 WAR. That’s pretty damn quality for a guy slotted to be the fifth starter at absolute best.
Like Mitre, no one was impressed with Wang this season. He started off pitching about as poorly as one could imagine, then hit the DL, then came back and was mediocre at best before succumbing to a shoulder injury. This led to a 5.38 FIP and a 6.01 tRA. Those numbers are both slightly worse than what Mitre posted in 2009. Both clearly had bad years, but because of what we’ve seen in the past, there’s a chance they’ll recover.
We know that Wang is a better pitcher than Mitre when they’re both right. We also know that Mitre can pitch the entire 2010 season, while Wang will pitch half at most. So, to begin answering Taz’s question, you might not want to cut loose Mitre and save his $1.25 million, because that investment can work for you all year, while the $5 million allotted to Wang will work only in the second half, if even that. But let’s take this a little further, into the completely theoretical.
Past performance does not guarantee future gains, but sometimes all we have to go on is past performance. For the sake of this argument, let’s assume that both Mitre and Wang return to their 2007 forms in 2010. Mitre would, under those circumstances, provide a 2.6 WAR for $1.25 million. Wang had a 4.4 WAR in 2007, almost two full wins better than Mitre. But because Wang would only pitch half the season, he’d only provided 2.2 WAR in 2010 under what I’m calling the best case scenario. The Yankees would pay him $5 million for that 2.2 WAR.
Even if both players recover fully to their 2007 forms, Mitre would provide a little more value than Wang. He’s the inferior pitcher, but because he can pitch the entire season he has that added value. Wang would be a greater force in the second half, but again he’d only be doing it for half a season, and he’d make four times as much as Mitre in the process. So there is an argument, albeit a weak one, that the Yankees are better off with Mitre in 2010.
Do I think that Mitre will provide 2.6 WAR in 2010? Not a chance. Not only will he not get the innings, but he also likely won’t return to the 0.54 HR/9 rate that led to his 3.98 FIP (a component of WAR). While WAR does adjust for park, I’m just not sure the adjustment will do Mitre’s transition justice. In 2007 he pitched in a spacious National League park. In 2010 he’ll pitch in a homer-heavy (but otherwise run-neutral) AL East park. He also probably won’t be higher than seventh on the starting pitching depth chart, so I would assume most of his innings will come out of the bullpen. I’d be surprised if he cleared a 1.5 WAR next year.
Do I think that Wang will provide 2.2 WAR in 2010? Probably not. I think he has a better chance of doing that than Mitre does of posting the same number, but that’s asking a lot from a guy who has missed a good portion of the past two seasons, and who is recovering from his third major shoulder injury. If he can provide 1.5 WAR in the second half, I’m sure the Yankees would be thrilled. That would not only help the rotation later in the season, but it would also give them hope of a fuller recovery for 2011.
Unless the Yankees are hard-up for 40-man roster spots (and as Mike will show, they’re not), they should exercise Mitre’s 2010 option. It will represent a little over one half of one percent of their overall payroll. The tougher question is of Wang. If tendered he’ll eat up a 40-man slot until they can place him on the 60-day DL in March, and he’ll constitute about 2.5 percent of the overall payroll. Is that worth the risk? I’m still not decided, though I’m leaning towards yes. I fear that non-tendering him means he goes elsewhere, and I do not want to see him make a full recovery with another team. Wang was the anchor of the staff for two seasons when the Yanks lacked an ace. WIth the current staff, he only has to be a No. 3. I think he can fit into the Yankees plans for 2010 and beyond.
What Went Wrong: Chien-Ming Wang
Posted by: | CommentsOver the next week or so, we’ll again break down what went wrong and what went right for the Yankees. The series this year will be much more enjoyable than the last.
The 2009 Yankees came into the season sporting one of the most exciting rotations in the big leagues, as imports CC Sabathia and AJ Burnett joined forces with the incumbent Chien-Ming Wang, Andy Pettitte, and Joba Chamberlain. After missing the last five months of 2008 with a fluke foot injury, Wang was supposed to be the rock in the two spot between Sabathia and Burnett. It was a pivotal season in the sinkerballer’s career, but instead it turned into a nightmare.
In his first start of the season, the Orioles put ten runners on base and scored seven runs while forcing Wang to throw 73 pitches in just 3.2 IP. Five days later, the Rays hung eight runs on Wang in just one inning of work. Five days after that, the Indians smacked him around for eight runs in 1.1 IP, and before long Wang ended up on the disabled list with what was called “weakness in the hips.”
There were all sorts of red flags about Wang’s early season performance. His velocity was down, his stuff wasn’t crisp, and he was elevating way too many pitches. It was all a recipe for disaster, and frankly that’s what those three starts were.
After working with the organization’s pitching instructors down in Tampa, Wang made a pair of better than good rehab starts (13 IP, 6 H, 0 R) with Triple-A Scranton before being hastily activated. His return from the disabled list was a clear panic move made after Joba was feared injured when he took a liner to the leg and left a start early. Working initially in relief, Wang was uncomfortable and his results were a mixed bag – just two runs in eight innings, but a .300 AVG against. Soon enough, the Yankees inserted Wanger back into the rotation, a rather questionable move.
His first start back in the rotation was ugly (eight baserunners and five runs in 4.2 IP against Texas), but after that he was pretty serviceable for about a month. The high point of Wang’s season came on June 28th, when he finally picked up his first win of the season thanks to 5.1 IP of two run ball in CitiField. In his next start, Wang left the mound with the trainer after serving up a meatball to Adam Lind.
At first, the latest injury didn’t seem serious. Wang was pain-free just two weeks after leaving his start, but not long after that he went down again after feeling pain during a game of catch. Three opinions later, Wang’s season was over in late July when he had season ending surgery to repair a torn labrum.
It may, or may not have all started in the offseason, when the Yankees told Wang to take it easy on his injured foot. It was used as an excuse, but frankly we’ll never know. The bottom line is that for the third time in eight years, the righthander missed a significant portion of the season with a shoulder issue.
And now, just a little more than four months after he last appeared in a game, Wang’s future with the Yankees is in doubt. Just the other day we heard that Wang was heading to see Dr. Andrews for a checkup on his surgically repaired shoulder, and reports indicate that he’s doing “remarkably well.” Regardless, there’s still a chance the Yankees will non-tender him in December, but even if they don’t, there’s no way the team could rely on him for anything next season.
The Yankees managed to win 103 games and their 27th World Series without their number two starter, but that doesn’t mean Wang’s awful season can be brushed under the rug.
Photo Credit: Nick Laham, Getty Images
How many championships has Mariano Rivera been worth?
Posted by: | CommentsThe following is a guest post by Rebecca Glass of This Purist Bleeds Pinstripes. You can read her (slightly longer) versions on her site, in four parts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4. We’re republishing it here because a) it took a lot of work and b) it’s really meant to be read as one article, anyway.
Special acknowledgment: This is far and away the most advanced, in depth thing I’ve ever tried. Without question, the best similarity I can come up with is asking someone who’s taken only high school Economics course to run the IMF, that’s basically what’s happened. As with any such endeavor, most of the actual work was done by others. With thanks to Jonathan Mayo, Will Moller, Joe Pawlikowski, Mike Axisa, Jim Johnson, Jamal Granger, Dave Cameron, Brent Nycz, Joshua Rosenberg, Dan Dilworth and Greg Fertel.
In this article, Rob Neyer dares us to come up with a way to measure how many Championships Mariano has been worth. Guess who enjoys masochism?
So, as you may know, there’s a myriad of stats out there, many of which I can only understand in theory, but there’s one measure that’s been created for the regular season that is very useful. You may have heard of it, as it’s called WAR — wins above replacement player.
NOTE: There are two measures we could use here, WAR and WARP, which try to accomplish the same thing (discussed below), but use two different sets of stats/data to do so. I’m going to stick with WAR because I think it sounds cooler. ANYWAY. So to understand WAR, two concepts are crucial: replacement level and leverage. I understand that many of you reading this will already be familiar with both of these, but since my hope is that those that don’t delve into stats very often can follow, and for the sake of my sanity, hope you won’t begrudge me a refresher.
Replacement Level
The idea behind replacement level is that you take any player in any line up on any given day and replace him with someone whose level of performance is what an average team can expect when trying to replace a player at minimal cost. In English, it’s saying that if, say, Andrew McCutchen went down on the Pirates with the flu, what’s the baseline production that the Pirates could expect from John Doe, who’s the cheapest available player to fill the spot? That production is replacement-level production.
Why not just use a league-average performance as a replacement? The answer is that the MLB statistics are largely skewed — MLB “regulars,” the guys putting up the big enough numbers to stay in lineups every day are a minority — while fringe players, those that struggle to stay in the big leagues, are much more common. Simply put, it’s easier to find a player that hits .250 than one that hits .330, but, like that student you wanted to kill because he got an A on that Spanish test while no one else did above a C, the one that hits .330 destroys the curve.
So, instead, you take into consideration what a GM and manager is likely to go for in the event of a player suddenly going down for a game or two–i.e., your utility infielder. Most teams–and the Yankees, of course, are not most teams–will go for whatever option is least costly–dipping into the pool of fringe Major Leaguers, the pool considered “freely available talent.” Of course, if a player is lost for a season, it’s an entirely different thing, but that gets beyond our scope.
What you end up with is on one end, you have your normal team–say the 2009 Yankees, and on the other, replacement-level team you’ve a line up where Wil Nieves is your best hitter, or Sidney Ponson as your best pitcher. What WAR does, then, is like having Nick Swisher go up to Joe Girardi before game six, and say, “Dude, I gave the Yanks, like x number more wins this season than you would have if Jerry Hairston had been your every day right fielder.”
(Note: via fangraphs, Hairston’s 2009 registered a WAR of 1.0, which indicates he performed above replacement level. Actually, this is helpful to give you an idea of how poorly a team with all replacement-level players would perform over the course of a season. Replacement Level is not the bench guys on the Yankees; it’s the bench guys on the Nationals and the Pirates.)
So before we move on, let’s make sure we understand everything that’s been discussed:
- The concept of Replacement Level enables us to compare performances of MLB “regulars” vs low-cost, “freely-available” replacement players.
- WAR is designed to measure how many more wins player X will net his team over player Replacement Level (i.e., our Swisher/Hairston faux metaphor).
- The values set for what a replacement level-performance entails varies by position — i.e., shortstops aren’t supposed to hit like right fielders, etc. Pitchers, too, have WAR. Over here you can see the rankings for pitchers, by WAR, for the 2009 season. To no one’s surprise, Zack Grienke tops the list. The type of season he had will do that to you.
What Went Right: The seventh inning on
Posted by: | CommentsOver the next week or so, we’ll again break down what went wrong and what went right for the Yankees. The series this year will be much more enjoyable than last.
Swisher celebrates one of the Yankees’ 15 walk-off wins. Photo: David Pokress
Against the 2009 Yankees, no lead was safe. Teams with four or five run leads heading into the seventh inning still had to beware. The slightest slip-up could lead to yet another Yankee comeback. Many teams fell victim to the Yankees late-innings machine, notably the 11 teams that lost to the Yankees in their final at-bat (with apologies to the Twins and Jays, who ran into the walk-off buzzsaw three times each). Those 15 wins made a huge difference in the Yankees season.
The Yankees led the AL in runs scored, OBP, SLG, and were just .002 behind the Angels in BA. From the seventh inning on, they led all these categories by a wide margin. Their 336 runs topped the next closest team, the Angels, by 48. They also led in all of the triple slash categories: .009 in BA, .020 in OBP, and .079 in SLG. That last stat owes much to home runs, which the Yanks led with 92. The next closest team, the Rays, had just 63.
Offensively, there was no team better than the Yankees from the seventh inning on. Yet for the team to enjoy those come from behind victories they also needed some key pitching performances. Without a shutdown bullpen to hold the other team in place, not even the Yankees’ late-innings offense can win that many games. To that end, the Yankees pitchers did their job, holding opponents to a .303 OBP from inning seven on, second to only the A’s at .302. They were also second best in slugging, .368, and tops in batting average against, .225. Unsurprisingly, they also struck out more batters than any other teams from innings seven on.
Let’s take a look at the individuals who were part of this incredibly run and how they contributed to wins with late-inning performances.
Derek Jeter: .341/.426/.512
Jeter had a stellar season at the plate, thriving in the leadoff slot. One of the highlights of the summer was watching Jeter slap the first pitch of the game into the shallow outfield for a base hit (or, in the case of Josh Beckett, over the fence for a homer). Yet Jeter saved his best performances for late in the game. Of his 18 home runs, eight came after the sixth inning. He also walked 24 times to 27 strikeouts, and stole five bases without being caught. When a comeback was in the works, Jeter was leading the charge.
Robinson Cano: .335/.371/.510
The knock on Cano in 2009 was his dearth of production with runners in scoring position. This naturally led to a narrative that painted Cano as a poor clutch performer. Yet in the later innings, when the Yanks mounted comebacks, Cano was at his best. His 105 total bases from the seventh inning on were second best on the team to Mark Teixeira. He also had two walk-off hits. While none of this erases Cano’s struggles with runners in scoring position, it helps dispel the idea that he can’t hit in the clutch. When the Yanks needed production late in the game, Cano was right there.
Brett Gardner: .330/.408/.527
Gardner hit just three home runs in 2009, and two came after the sixth inning. One of them was integral in a comeback against the Twins, an inside-the-park home run that got a quiet crowd on its feet. Gardner didn’t come to the plate as frequently as others on the team, but when he did, he produced.
Johnny Damon: .304/.401/.553
Early in the season, it seemed like Damon was coming up big all the time. Even when the Yanks eventually lost he provided some late-innings heroics. Ten of his 24 homers came in late innings situations, including his walk-off shot against the Twins. Damon also displayed excellent patience in the late innings, striking out just 26 times to 25 walks.
Hideki Matsui: .302/.403/.597
Early in the season Hideki struggled, but when the games moved into the later innings he thrived. He was one of three Yankees with an OPS over 1.000 from the seventh inning on. Nearly half of his 28 home runs came in that span as well (13 of 28). When we think of late-inning performances, it’s easy to think of A-Rod and his walk-off homers or Melky and his heroics, but Matsui was a huge part of the team’s success in that regard. His performance in the late innings might have been underrated.
Melky Cabrera: .298/.370/.427
If Melky could hit in innings one through six like he did from inning seven on, he’d be a major asset for the Yankees. I do think, after watching him improve in the 2009 season, that he can be that, though that’s a topic for another post. Melky had his share of walk-off moments, but that doesn’t tell the whole story. He hit his best in the late innings, and that helped the Yankees achieve a number of come from behind victories.
Alex Rodriguez: .297/.428/.633
I can’t count how many times I sarcastically yelled “unclutch!” when A-Rod came up with a big hit in 2009. His two walk-off home runs only begin to tell the story of how he came up big in the late innings. Two of his biggest hits of the year, in fact, don’t show up on the walk-off highlight reels. His game-tying home run off Brad Lidge set up a Melky Cabrera walk-off. My favorite A-Rod hit, though, came in June against the Red Sox. Down 2-1 in the eighth, A-Rod smacked a double to put the Yankees ahead. They eventually lost the game, but that hit was just huge.
Mark Teixeira: .282/.376/.630
The 3-4-5 combination of Tex, A-Rod, and Matsui dominated the late innings. They all had OPSs above 1.000, and each hit at least 13 home runs in those situations. Teixeira led the way with 16, and also smacked 13 late-innings doubles. His 114 total bases led the team.
Jorge Posada: .254/.364/.468
Jorge didn’t put up the best numbers in the late innings, but that’s only compared to his teammates. In isolation, his hitting from the seventh inning on was pretty good, and he had two walk-off hits to show for it. His walk-off single against the Blue Jays on July 4th weekend prompted one of my favorite questions to Girardi this season, courtesy of Kim Jones. “So Joe, how’d you like the single by Jorge?” I only wish Girardi had answered, “Hated it, Kim. I wanted this one to go at least 16.”
Nick Swisher: .240/.358/.485
Thinking back on the Yankees late-innings dramatics, I don’t remember much of Swisher. His walk-off homer against Tampa was memorable because it was his first walk-off win of the year. But he also had a big homer to tie the game against the White Sox. Swish hit better earlier in the game, though he still had 83 total bases in innings seven on, more than Jorge, A-Rod, and Melky, and just behind Damon and Jeter.
In celebration of the Yankees late-innings performances, we have this:
How did Pettitte fare after high stress starts in 2009?
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Later on tonight, Andy Pettitte will make his final start of 2009, for better or worse. As you know, he’ll be working on three days’ rest for the first time since 2006, and many fans are concerned about how the 37-year-old will rebound on short rest. While his stats on three days’ rest are pretty good (3-1, 2.80 ERA in five career short rest starts in the playoffs), the data is so old and not indicative of anything that it might as well be recorded in hieroglyphics.
Instead of relying on those numbers, let’s take a look at how Pettitte fared on normal four days’ rest following what I’ll call “high stress outings” in 2009. By “high stress outings,” I mean starts in which Andy threw a lot of pitches while allowing lots of baserunners in not many innings. Think 5.1 IP, 9 H, 4 R, 3 BB kind of outings. Then, by looking at how he performed four days later, it’ll give us an approximation of what Pettitte will do tonight. It’s obviously not a perfect comparison, but it’s better than pretty much anything else we have right now.
Game Three over the weekend wasn’t kind to Andy, but he battled through six innings while putting eight men on base and letting four runners cross the plate. He threw 104 pitches, so it would definitely be considered a “high stress outing.” Let’s see how Pettitte rebounded from similar starts this year.
High Stress Outing: April 26th @ Boston: 6 IP, 6 H, 4 BB, 4 R, 116 pitches, -0.14 WPA
Next Start: May 1st vs Anaheim: 5.2 IP, 9 H, 4 BB, 5 R, 111 pitches, +0.02 WPA
HSO: May 18th vs Twins: 6.2 IP, 12 H, 1 BB, 4 R, 105 pitches, -0.03 WPA
NS: May 23rd vs Phillies: 7 IP, 5 H, 2 BB, 4 R, 114 pitches, -0.11 WPA
HSO: June 3rd vs Texas: 5 IP, 7 H, 6 BB, 4 R, 104 pitches, -0.17 WPA
NS: June 8th vs Tampa: 6 IP, 5 H, 3 BB, 3 R, 104 pitches, +0.06 WPA
HSO: June 25th @ Atlanta: 3.2 IP, 7 H, 3 BB, 6 R, 95 pitches, -0.23 WPA
NS: July 1st vs Seattle: 7 IP, 6 H, 1 BB, 2 R, 98 pitches, +0.17 WPA
HSO: July 6th vs Toronto: 6 IP, 5 H, 5 BB, 6 R, 109 pitches, -0.20 WPA
NS: July 11th @ Anaheim: 4.1 IP, 7 H, 2 BB, 6 R, 83 pitches, -0.32 WPA
HSO: August 21st @ Boston: 5 IP, 7 H, 2 BB, 7 R, 105 pitches, +0.05 WPA
NS: August 26th vs Texas: 7 IP, 5 H, 3 BB, 2 R, 103 pitches, +0.23 WPA
I was going to break it down start-by-start, but after recapping the first one, I gave up because all I would be doing is giving too much credit to the already small sample size. It wasn’t worth the time.
So anyway, that’s six instances this season when Andy really had to work hard to get outs, then had to come back and pitch four days later. In those six follow-up starts, Pettitte averaged 6.1 IP, 6.2 H, 2.5 BB, 3.7 R, 102.2 pitches, +0.05 WPA, which is not great, but it’s certainly serviceable. The good news that with exception of that July 1st start against the Mariners, all of the follow-up starts came against good offensive clubs, so the data isn’t too skewed.
Pettitte’s average start this year was 6.1 IP, 6.0 H, 2.4 BB, 3.2 R, 103 pitches, +0.05 WPA, which is ridiculously close to his average in those follow-up starts. The biggest difference is that he allowed half a run more following a real tough outing, which is probably just a BABIP thing since the number of baserunners and innings pitched are nearly identical. I have to say, I’m somewhat surprised by the results.
Of course, these starts come on regular four days’ rest in the middle of the season, not three day’s rest after Pettitte already has 219.2 IP on his left arm. We can arbitrarily dock him an inning and tack on another run, meaning we should expect 5+ innings and about 5 runs tonight, but that’s nothing more than guesswork.
What I wanted to see with this post is how Pettitte rebounded after a taxing start, and as you can see above, he generally didn’t suffer any sort of hangover. It’s far from a perfect analysis, but it’s much better than just assuming he’ll do bad for no other reason than because you have a bad feeling about it.
Photo Credit: Brian Kersey, UPI
How would the Yankees use the double switch?
Posted by: | CommentsFor the first time since June, the Yankees will be without the benefit of the designated hitter, a big part of their offense. That role has been Hideki Matsui’s this year, and he performed admirably, posting a .274/.367/.509 line across 526 plate appearances. He didn’t play an inning of outfield all season, though, bringing into question his role for the next three games.
It appears that Girardi has ruled out the possibility of starting Matsui in the outfielld. Carig reports that Matsui could play the outfield in a double switch situation, which would place him in the outfield for the first time since June 15, 2008. Yet there seems to be only one scenario where a double switch would make any sense.
The double switch involves a manager substituting a position player for the pitcher, and a pitcher for a position player. This only works if 1) the pitcher’s spot is due up in the next inning, and 2) the position player leaving the game isn’t due up before the pitcher’s spot. This creates a problem for the Yankees, because their lineup will probably look like this:
1. Jeter
2. Damon
3. Teixeira
4. Rodriguez
5. Posada
6. Cano
7. Cabrera
8. Swisher
9. Pitcher
Cabrera and Swisher at the bottom of that lineup make the double switch tough when it involves Matsui. If, say, Cano makes the last out, the pitcher would be due up but two of the double switch candidates are due up first. All Girardi could do at that point is to sub the relief pitcher for Johnny Damon, which staves off the pitcher’s spot by only two batters. If the Yanks put two men on base in the next inning, the pitcher comes up any way and you’ve just pointlessly lost Damon’s bat.
If Cabrera makes the last out it creates another tough situation. In a double switch the pitcher would come in for Cabrera, meaning the substitution would have to play center field — no way that Swisher or Damon does at this point. That means Gardner, who would hit after Swisher to start the inning. Unless you absolutely needed the reliever for multiple innings, wouldn’t it just make sense to pinch hit Matsui in the nine spot and call on another pitcher for the next inning?
It could make sense if Swisher makes the last out of the inning. Matsui would then sub for the pitcher and take over in right field. He would also lead off the next inning. But in that scenario, if the game is close, Girardi would probably pinch run Gardner for Matsui if he got on. At that point he’d be better off just pinch hitting with Matsui, since the move commits to less. Then if Damon makes the last out of that inning, you could insert Hideki into left and leave the pitcher in the two hole. You could do that in the double switch scenario too, I suppose.
Going through double switch situations is something new for us fans of AL teams, and it’s certainly an exercise. The problem in doing this is that to double switch with Matsui would hamper the defense. Straight pinch hitting assignments could work better, unless there’s a serious lineup alignment issue. Then, and only then, should Girardi double switch. If he doesn’t need the reliever for multiple innings, straight pinch hitting is the way to go.
The one scenario I can see this working is in a straight pinch hitting situation. If Matsui pinch hits for the pitcher and Damon makes the final out of that inning, Girardi could send Matsui out to left and insert the new pitcher into the two spot.
I’m sure I’ve missed a few scenarios (and might have even botched some). This is where I love the comments.
