Archive for Defense

Outfield Defense

That graph comes courtesy of Dan Turkenkopf at Beyond the Box Score. Dan took the vector data from Dave Pinto’s database and plotted it to show where each of the Yanks’ starting outfielders excels defensively. Basically what you’re seeing is how good each player is on balls hit to a specific “zone,” with green being good and red being bad. The center fielder is shown above the corner guys just so you can see the overlap, it doesn’t mean that balls hit to corners will go undefended or anything like that. And also don’t worry about the background, the New Stadium will have the same dimensions as the old joint.

The very first thing I noticed was how bad Nady is on balls hit right at him, basically about five outs worse than expected. He’s even weak to his immediate right and left, which tells me that he’s just not very instinctive out there, and is at his best defensively when it’s obvious off the bat that he’ll need some hustle to get to the ball. You know what would be cool? If Mr. Turkenkopf put one of these together with Swisher in right instead of the X-man. (nudge nudge)

Damon is the opposite of Nady, eating up everything hit close to him, which is what you’d expect from a veteran Major League outfielder. He’s also stronger going to his right, which probably has something to do with him not having to reach across his body with his glove to field balls on that side. Gardner’s very strong out there, making plays on everything hit even remotely close to him. He shows the same pattern of struggling to get to balls that would require him to reach across his body with his glove, so my theory might hold a little water. Of course the small sample size police are in full force with Gardy.

Judging from the graph, it looks like the biggest problem areas are the gaps (expected), specifically the left-center field gap. And, you know, the whole Nady in right field thing. Joe and I have mentioned on the podcast several times that the hardest ball to field is the one hit right at you, but it looks like Nady is the only one in the Yanks outfield with this issue.

This is some really interesting stuff. What do you guys think?

Categories : Defense
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A few weeks ago the folks at ACTA Sports were kind enough to send along a copy of The Fielding Bible Volume II, John Dewan’s study on defensive metrics. Instead of reviewing the entire 400-page tome in one shot, I thought I’d address a number of issues throughout the week. We’ll start off with a topic which has been beaten into the ground over the past few years: Derek Jeter’s defense. As it turns out, his Gold Gloves might be justified.

This isn’t to say that Jeter’s range is any better than we’ve come to understand. He still has trouble ranging to his left, and that’s probably not going to improve. Yet he’s not a complete black hole out there. As it turns out, Jeter ranked best in the majors last year in Defensive Misplays, a visual metric developed by Bill James which attempts to succeed where errors fail in determining poor defensive plays. Says James:

A defensive misplay is a very specific observation of a very narrowly defined event, created in such a way as to keep the scorer’s use of judgment to an absolute minimum.

An error is based on what “ought” to happen in the mind of an official scorer. A-Rod should have fielded that cleanly; Robinson Cano should have made a better throw to first. James attempts to strip the subjective observation of the scorer and create a defined set of circumstances which will determine a defensive misplay. There are 54 different types of defensive misplays. Here’s his example:

Failing to anticipate the wall — Outfielder goes to the outfield wall, allowing a ball to bounce over his head back toward the infield, allowing a runner or runners to take bases which they might not have been able to take had the fielder turned and played the ball off the wall.

The scorer has to ask himself only two questions:

1) Did the outfielder go to the wall in an effort to catch the ball, and
2) Did the ball bounce over his head back toward the infield?

The scorer does not ask himself “Did the fielder have a real chance to catch the ball?” or “Should the fielder have chased the ball to the wall in that situation? or “Should an ordinary fielder have known that he could not catch the ball at the wall?” or anything like that. It’s two simple questions: Did he chase the ball to the wall, and did the ball bounce over his head back toward the infield?

While James attempts to separate subjective judgment from objective observation, he’s not always successful in The Fielding Bible. I’ll agree with Mitchel Lichtman’s critique: “However, as you read more about his Defensive Misplays (DM’s), it becomes clear that many of them are very subjective, or at least not as objective as he claims DM’s are in general.” Still, it tries to add more context to the idea of an error, beyond the official scorer determining that a player messed up.

(Oh, and you’ll never guess who led the league in the above-cited defensive misplay. Yes, it was Bobby Abreu, in a tie with — wait for it — Nate McLouth.)

Jeter’s strength, according to James’s system, is his ability to cleanly field balls he reaches. He led all shortstops last year with just 17 defensive misplays in 1,259 innings at short. Even when you count errors — which James claims were not counted in Defensive Misplays, so there’s no doubling up — Jeter comes out as the best shortstop in the majors.

This puts Jeter’s Gold Gloves in a bit better context. After all, it’s easier to see plays that were made than those that weren’t. It might not be easy for an observer to see all the balls Jeter doesn’t get to. Routine grounder through the hole for a single, one might think. That’s an easy observation to make, since it’s difficult to determine whether Jeter should have gotten to the ball or, even more difficultly, if one of Jeter’s peers would have cleanly fielded the grounder. Because he’s so good on the balls he does get to, that’s translated into playing good defense, hence the Gold Gloves.

When it comes to range, we know that Jeter doesn’t get much respect. If you check out his UZR you’ll see that since 2003 he’s ranged from slightly below average to freaking atrocious (namely 2005 and 2007). Last year he was just below average by that metric. Since this is a Fielding Bible review, we’ll also look at Dewan’s plus/minus system. That one’s a bit harsher on Jeter, rating him a -9 (-8 for fielding, -1 for his double play turning). That puts him fourth lowest among qualifying shortstops, besting only Yuniesky Betancourt (another guy who reputedly plays good D), Jeff Keppinger, and David Eckstein. During the three years from 2006 through 2008, Jeter ranks dead last at -50 — and it’s not even close.

The difference between the two systems is something we should certainly explore further. While Dewan had Jeter in the cellar in terms of defensive range, UZR was a bit kinder in 2008, ranking him 11th in the majors, ahead of Jose Reyes. More notably, UZR has Jeter ahead of Christian Guzman, who ranked fifth in Dewan’s plus/minus system. Clearly, there are flaws in defensive metrics. Geoff Baker, beat writer for The Seattle Times, has a comprehensive and intelligent look at defensive metrics. I highly recommend the read.

Does Jeter’s ability to avoid misplays compensate for his lack of range? It’s tough to say, especially when we’re working with inherently flawed statistics. I will agree with Steve Lombardi’s conclusion: “In a nutshell, it’s his ability to avoid “Defensive Misplays” that has enabled Derek Jeter to win Gold Glove awards in the past. And, it’s probably the same reason why the Yankees haven’t moved him off shortstop yet.” That and ego, of course.

We’ll close this out with a scouting take on Jeter, also from The Fielding Bible, just to even out all this statistical talk:

Then there is the signature Jeter play, when he fields a backhander in the hole and makes his patented jump-throw. Jeter still excels at this play, but it disguises the fact that he does it because he lacks the arm strength to plant his feet and throw. His arm also causes him to play more shallow than other shortstops, cutting down on his range.

The last comment about playing shallow makes plenty of sense. Certainly, playing shallow would make it tough for Jeter to get to those up the middle balls. Regarding the first observation about the jump-throw, it might sound intuitively incorrect. You can’t make as strong a throw while you’re in the air, right? No, you can’t, but you can also get rid of it quicker. What Dewan means here is that Jeter needs to do the jump-throw, because it would take him additional time to stop, plant, and make a strong throw. Because his arm isn’t as strong, he needs a quick release. It’s along the lines of Johnny Damon’s arm not costing the Yanks any runs — a topic we’ll visit later in the week.

You can get The Fielding Bible–Volume II from Amazon.com for $16.29. That’s our Amazon Associate code, so if you buy the book from that link you’ll kick us a few pennies.

Categories : Defense
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Jan
22

Check out those guns

Posted by: Benjamin Kabak | Comments (73)

Over at The Hardball Times, John Walsh analyzed the outfield arms across baseball. He uses a rigorous methodology which you can read about at THT to come up with a metric that “represent[s] the number of runs that an average fielder would save playing half his games in [his team's home] park.” The numbers for the 2008 Yanks were not pretty. Bobby Abreu and Johnny Damon cost the Yanks -9.7 below average, and while Melky’s center field contributions were positive, his 3.0 runs saved above average mark couldn’t counteract the corners. Xavier Nady, splitting time between two teams, put up a 4.4 positive contribution. It will be interesting to see how the seemingly revamped Yankee outfield does in 2009, and these numbers don’t make a strong case for Damon in the outfield.

Categories : Asides, Defense
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Yesterday, Dave Pinto looked at the PMR for defense behind pitchers. For those unfamiliar with PMR, it stands for Probabilistic Model of Range, and it compares the number of balls in play and compares it to predicted outs and actual outs. Read the link above for a better explanation and past PMR ratings. The defense behind pitchers is a neat one, because we’re supposed to see how a defense benefitted or hurt a pitcher.

The Yankees kind of stick out on this list. First is Chien-Ming Wang, who seems to be the pitcher most helped by his defense. On the other end of the spectrum are Andy Pettitte and Darrell Rasner, who are among the most hurt by the defense behind them. So what gives? Can the Yankees defense be like eight Omar Vizquels when Wang pitches, but turn into eight Jason Giambis when Pettitte and Rasner take the hill?

Clearly, I think this has something to do with the pitcher himself. One thing I’ve noticed over the years with Wang is not only his ability to induce groundballs, but also his ability to induce poor contact. Even balls in the air don’t have much under them. Yeah, you might make Johnny move a few steps, but it’s not like he’s giving up many screamers into the gap. That’s the beauty of Chien-Ming Wang.

On the other end, with Pettitte, I’m not sure what to think. It’s comforting, I suppose, to think that the defense behind Andy, which we know isn’t among the best in the league, played a role in his poor second half. But what if he was just giving up a lot of hard-hit balls, ones that the defense had no shot at? That’s going to show in these defensive numbers, even though it’s not necessarily the defense’s fault.

Another interesting note: Dice-K was second on the list. So he gave up the fourth most walks in baseball — most in the American League — and had his defense convert the second most balls in play into outs? I’m really interested to see how next year turns out.

Categories : Defense
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Oct
27

On Derek’s defense, again

Posted by: Benjamin Kabak | Comments (88)

In 1997, during his age 36 season, Cal Ripken, a far superior defensive short stop than Derek Jeter, moved over to the Hot Corner. He knew he couldn’t man short, and for the good of the team, he shifted to his right. In 2009, Derek Jeter will play his age 35 season, and the debate over his defense has raged for years. This weekend, Dugout Central chimed in on the issue and wondered when and to where the captain would shift positions. Jeter has been vocal in insisting that he’s not going to move off short, but at some point soon, he should.

Categories : Asides, Defense
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Let’s be clear: I’m not trying to bury Melky Cabrera. I simply think he’s vastly overrated (and, incidentally, think that if any GM overrates him so, we should see what we can get for him). His arm is valuable in center, but as I’ve continually noted, he often takes poor routes to balls, resulting in him making fewer plays than he should given his range. Dave Pinto’s Probabilistic Model of Range agrees with me. It actually rates Melky below Johnny Damon in center.

Now, this clearly isn’t a flawed metric. I think we can all see, on the whole, that Melky is better defensively in center than Damon at this point in his career. However, that’s heavily considering Melky’s arm. When it comes to ability to get to batted balls, they’re on more even ground. If there’s a gap shot to right center, I’d actually feel more comfortable with Damon running it down than Melky (though that’s just one man’s opinion). But on a medium fly ball with a runner on third and less than two outs, you and I would both rather have Melky there.

Anyway, I just wanted to use PMR to illustrate that point. Johnny Damon is by no means a poor center fielder. He just has Berniearm. And yes, in many ways that can hurt us over the course of a season. But if we were to get a quality offer for Melky, I would be totally comfortable with Damon starting the year in center field. Check that: as long as Matsui isn’t in left. I understand how poor that would make our outfield defense.

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In his yearly tradition, Dave Pinto has posted his Probabilistic Model of Range for the 2007 season. Over the next week or so he’ll post the results for each player by position. Today, though, he goes over teams as a whole. I’ll point to Pinto’s brief explanation of PMR:

Basically, for each fieldable (non inside the park home runs) ball put in play, six parameters are used to determine how difficult it was to field the ball. A probability of turning the ball into an out is calculated, and those probabilities are summed. That gives us expected batted balls turned into outs. We turn that into a predicted DER (defensive efficiency record), compare that to the actual DER and calculate a ranking.

The model is based primarily on visiting player data, smoothed, distance on fly balls. Only 2007 data was used to construct the model.

Now, the Yankees were far from the top spot in DER. However, the difficulty of balls put in play against them moved them to the top spot. What does this tell us about the team?

Well, for one, they don’t strike out a ton of guys, ranking 12th in the American League in 2007. Hopefully this changes with Joba and Hughes in the rotation next year.

The question this poses to me: Did the Yankees pitching get lucky last year? PMR would suggest yes. A lot of the “difficult” plays the Yankees made over the course of the year could just as easily have gone for hits. Such is the nature of baseball. Sometimes the ball has eyes, sometimes it goes right to a fielder. All you can do is hit the ball hard, and it appears that’s what happened against Yankee pitching last year.

Thankfully we’re heading into 2008 with an altered rotation.

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