Archive for Defense

A few Sunday morning links for your reading pleasure:

Tim Marchman of SI.com addresses the problem with defensive stats and I couldn’t agree with him more.  While there is some value in the various defensive stats and the other stats that derive from them (WAR, VORP, etc.) I don’t think we can throw these out there every time to prove that Player X is better than Player Y simply because he has a better WAR.  The data isn’t 100% reliable as is shown by different metrics for these stats. I don’t know that there will ever be a perfect fielding metric as it will always have some subjectivity, having one uniform stat would be a good start.

Zack Greinke is unhappy in Kansas City.  Let the speculation begin, especially in New York.  I’m sure this offseason will be full of Greinke trade rumors, and whether or not the Yankees are involved they will be linked.  I think the Royals should trade him, looking for a Teixeira to the Braves type of package as they won’t go anywhere while Greinke is under his current contract and look at what the Tex trade has done for Texas.  While he is more than just a rental, the Royals should strike and get as big a package as possible.  From the Yankees perspective I’d just go all in on signing Cliff Lee and let Greinke go elsewhere.  The cost will simply be too much if he does go anywhere.

Another blown save by Jonathan Papelbon (and a doozy) and another article questioning whether he should be demoted with Daniel Bard taking over as closer.  As a Yankees fan I can only dream the Sox decide to put Papelbon in the 8th.  That would be beyond fantastic.  When Papelbon has been bad this year he has been really bad, but I don’t think it’s time to go to Bard.  I hope both Yankee and Sox fans get their wishes and the switch is made. I can’t imagine what we’d hear coming from Papelbon’s mouth if it happened, but I would get my popcorn ready if it goes down.

Here’s an article about one of the newest (and already hated by some) Yankees, Lance Berkman. It’s mainly about what he went through at the trade deadline and what he’s gone through since.  Pretty interesting to note the teams he was ok going to and those he wasn’t.  I can’t imagine why San Diego was ever interested in him, were they going to put him in the OF?  Scary thought.  Anyway it’s an interesting take from his point of view and also take note of the comments below the article.  Only a few fans have commented but they seem to show what a class act Lance was and expect him to help the Yankees in a big way. So do I.

Categories : Defense, Links
Comments (83)

One of the Yankees’ obvious weaknesses this season is their defense behind the plate. Jorge Posada has long been a butcher back there, and even though Frankie Cervelli was voted as the organization’s best defensive catcher several years in a row by Baseball America, extended playing time in 2010 has exposed him as no better than average defensively. At least for now, I mean, he could always improve with more reps and experience.

Posada has thrown out just 19% of attempted basestealers this year, Cervelli even less at 14%, and that’s just part of it. The passed balls have allowed countless runners move up, and there’s no better example of it than this game against the Mariners two weeks ago. Posada allowed two runners to move up on a passed ball in the 8th inning, and one pitch later a two run single tied the game. While not completely responsible for the blown lead, the defensive miscue was certainly a big factor.

AP Photo/Frank Franklin II

Considering how much we’ve talked about catcher’s defense this year, I wanted to try and come up with an actual number for how many runs the Yanks’ backstops have cost them defensively this season. Because there are so many immeasurables when to comes to catcher’s defense, we’re going to have to stick with the basics: stolen bases, caught stealings, wild pitches, and passed balls. Of course this isn’t perfect, because it’s not just catchers that factor into those four stats, pitchers have a say as well. The broad assumption in this analysis is that the pitcher’s effect will even out when looking at the 30 teams across the first half of the season.

Stolen bases and caught stealings are nice and easy to understand, a guy either successfully stole a base or he didn’t. There’s a little more of a gray area with wild pitches and passed balls because official scorers and their sometimes questionable decisions come into play, and there are certainly wild pitches that a catcher doesn’t even have a chance to make a play on (say a pitch over everyone’s head to the backstop). I’m looking at it in a bottom line kinda way, did the catcher stop the ball or not? Good catchers will still stop a fair share of would-be wild pitches, and even then we’ll assume the number of plays a backstop had no chance on will even out given the sample.

I tallied up each teams total in the four stat categories for the 2010 season, then assigned run values to each event based on The Book. Defensively, a stolen base against costs a team 0.16 runs, but throwing a runner out trying to steal saves 0.45 runs. You don’t need to be a sabermetric whiz to understand that losing a baserunner hurts a team more than moving one up 90 feet helps. Wild pitches cost 0.26 runs, passed balls 0.28. It makes sense that those two are close in value, since they’re basically the same thing with two different names. I turned everything into a rate stat for comparison purposes, arbitrarily selecting 180 innings as my unit of time (20 games).

The big league average is exactly two runs lost defensively per 180 innings, which passes the sniff test because it’s tough for a catcher to prevent runs in this analysis. He’d have to throw out a ton of runners to actually save runs, which just isn’t realistic. It basically comes down to who gives up the fewest runs. The AL average is 2.2 runs lost, the NL 1.9. I ran the numbers just to see if the small ball NL approach had a big impact in the numbers, but it’s good to see that they’re close. I’m going to use ML average for the rest of the post.

You can see my entire table of results here. The table’s too big to embed, so just click the link if you want to see the full breakdown by team. My fancy acronym for this stat is cRSAA/180, which stands for catcher’s runs saved above average per 180 innings. Yes, I just wanted a nerdy name, so sue me. All I did was figure out how many total runs a team lost defensively per 180 innings, and compared it to that 2.0 ML average. The Cardinals have the game’s best defensive catching corps, saving 1.9 runs above the league average per 180 innings. This passes the sniff test because Yadier Molina has a reputation as a studly defensive backstop. The Diamondbacks are on the other end of the spectrum at 2.4 runs below average. Apparently they’re bad at everything.

The Yankees came in at 1.4 runs below average, tied for fourth worst in the game. The only teams below them are the D-Backs, Pirates (-1.6 cRCAA/180) and Angels (-1.5), and they were tied with both the Giants and Red Sox. Over a 162 game season, assuming nine inning games, the Yanks’ catchers will cost them 11.34 runs defensively, which is basically one win. For comparison’s sake, St. Louis would pick up a win and half because of their catcher’s defense, Arizona would lose another two games. The different between the best and worst teams is three and a half wins, hardly insignificant.

It probably didn’t surprise you that the Yanks came in towards the bottom of the pack, or at least it shouldn’t have. Let’s break it down individually for Posada and Cervelli…

First of all, apologies to Chad Moeller. Secondly, as you can see neither Posada or Cervelli are assets on defense. Posada has cost the team 1.8 runs below average with his glove for every 180 innings he’s caught this year, Cervelli a touch less at 1.1. If Posada were to catch 120 nine inning games, his defense would cost the team 10.8 runs, or one win. Of course his offense, even at 2010 levels, would provide just over 17 runs, so the next gain is six runs, for all intents and purposes.

Cervelli, on the other hand, would cost the team 6.6 runs below average if he played 120 nine inning games, and his bat would also be another 7.4 runs below average assuming 2010 levels of production. All told, the Yankees would be 14 runs in the red with Cervelli as their starting catcher compared to six runs in the black with Posada. It’s a 20 run difference, two wins in a tight AL East. This assumes a set designated hitter and that only one of the two catchers play per game.

Yes, this is an extremely oversimplified way of looking at things. There are parts of catcher’s defense that we can’t even begin to quantify, but the information we do have tells us that the Yanks’ catchers are hurting them with the glove. Posada mitigates all of that damage with his stick, Cervelli not so much. He’s supposed to be just a backup though, so in theory it shouldn’t hurt as much. You expect those guys to be below average. The real problem is that Cervelli has had to play so much this season that both his bat and glove have become detriments to the team in a very real way.

Catching issues are hard to hide just because of the nature of the game. The catcher is in on every play, every pitch. The demands of the position are so extraordinary that most of the time you’re just looking for the least harmful option. You don’t expect offense, you just hope for something more than complete incompetence.  The Yankees’ catchers are holding them back a bit this year, but their pitching and offense is good enough to more than make up that lost win in the standings.

Categories : Defense
Comments (77)

Photo credit: Kathy Willens/AP

It’s unsurprising for anyone who has watched most of the season to date, but it appears that Derek Jeter has taken a step backwards defensively. Last year he made marked improvements, and the numbers confirmed what our eyes saw. This year we’ve seen him miss a number of plays, particularly those to his right. While the readily available defensive numbers don’t break down his defense that far, ESPN’s Mark Simon tracked down the specific left-right splits for Jeter.

In the winter of 2007-2008, Brian Cashman had a conversation with Jeter in which Cashman raised the issue of Jeter’s diminished defensive range. Jeter had not heard this from coaches or teammates, but made a commitment to improve. He started doing workouts that helped balance the typical workload of a baseball player. Because there are so many repetitive one-way movements — running the bases and swinging the bat — a player can become unbalanced. Jeter’s workouts strove to help him work both sides of his body.

It seemed to work. Not only did Jeter look better in the field starting in 2008, but the numbers reflected it. On Baseball Info Solutions’ +/- scale, Jeter rated just -1 to his left in 2008, and improved to +2 in 2009. This seemed to hamper his range to his right, usually his strong point, but even then he adjusted. After rating -18 in 2008, Jeter climbed to -3 in 2009. After another off-season of balanced workouts, we might have seen Jeter improve further, or at least negate the effects of age.

Instead we’ve seen him decline on balls to his left, on which he currently rates a -7. Again, this is no surprise to the faithful followers. Jeter has missed a number of balls, and has come close to missing a few more. I particularly remember a play in Detroit where it appeared he would smoothly scoop a grounder up the middle, but he hesitated at the last moment and had to make a spinning throw. On the good side, Jeter has been excellent on balls to his right, rating a +7.

At this point in his career, we can’t expect Jeter to become a top defensive shortstop. The balls up the middle are frustrating to watch, but it is reassuring to know that he’s at least making some plays that other shortstops have not. Still, it’s certainly going to affect his contract negotiations after this season. How much will Derek Jeter the shortstop cost compared to Derek Jeter the guy who will have to move off the position in a couple of years?

Categories : Defense
Comments (26)

When the Yankees lose, we tend to look everywhere for someone or something to blame. Among the many perceived goats for last night’s game is Randy Winn, not just for his game ending strikeout, but because of his positioning on Jeremy Hermida’s go-ahead double in the top of the ninth. Winn was playing shallow (so was centerfielder Brett Gardner, but we like him), only to have the ball go over his head for a double. MJ Recanati went so far as to say Johnny Damon would have caught that ball, wondering if the 13-year big league vet had ever heard of no doubles defense.

I’ll give MJ a pass on that because I’m sure when he wrote that after the game he was just as livid as I was, but no doubles defense is the wrong call in that spot. Before we touch the philosophical side of outfield positioning, let’s first look at the facts. Below is Mariano Rivera‘s spray chart from 2009, courtesy of Katron.org

For further reference, here’s his 2008 spray chart as well. 2010 is a tiny sample, it does nothing for us.

Clearly, Rivera does not allow many balls to be hit to deep left field, just five total from ’08-’09. It’s the nature of the cutter. If a righty is going to hit it, he’s got to slap it the other way. If a lefty wants to hit it, he’s got to pull his hands in and muscle it out of the infield, hence all the bloops hits and shallow singles Mo gives up. Only three balls during the 2009 season were hit like the ball Hermida hit off Rivera last night, and you’re talking about 247 batters faced (130 lefties).

Furthermore, even if Mo wasn’t on the mound, just think about the situation. There were two outs in the inning, so the runners on second and third (Marco Scutaro and Darnell McDonald, respectively) were going on contact. They were going both going to score on a single, nevermind a double. You bring the outfielders in to play the percentages, cutting off the most likely event. With Mo and his amazing ability to induce weak contact on the mound, it makes even more sense to do that.

Sometimes though, you just gotta tip your cap and credit the other guy. Give Hermida some props for a nice piece of hitting. Seriously, look where this pitch was…

That’s a great pitch, a 90 mph cutter on the outer black. Hermida just went out and got it. It happens. Not very often, but it happens.

I know it’s easy to jump on Winn or the coaching staff or whoever for poor positioning on a play like that, especially since Randy kinda stinks, but in this case it’s not justified. He was positioned properly, Rivera executed his pitch, and Hermida just beat him. Simple as that.

Categories : Defense
Comments (39)
Apr
16

Been caught stealing once

Posted by: | Comments (65)

If I told you that the Yanks would start the season going 6-3 against the Red Sox, Rays and Angels – three teams considered to be among the AL’s top contenders this year – would you have believed me? The Yanks currently lead the AL in runs scored and have allowed fewer runs than any of their AL East opponents. The franchise hasn’t seen a start this good since 2003 when the Yanks went 8-1 over their first nine contests, and everyone is feeling pretty good about things.

At the risk of reading too much into the results from just nine games, there is one stat though that leaps out at me as problematic. Yankee backstops have caught just one of the 13 runners who have attempted to steal against them. Jorge Posada, the Yanks’ offensive-minded catcher, has allowed 10 of 11 runners to take a base while Francisco Cervelli, the defensive back-up, allowed both runners to steal against him on Saturday. Although some of the fault lies with the team’s pitchers, only the hapless Orioles, who have allowed 14 of 15 runners to steal, have a worse mark in the early going.

Generally speaking, these stolen bases haven’t had a tremendous impact on the Yanks’ win chances yet. For example, whereas Dave Roberts’ infamous stolen base increased Boston’s win expectancy from 37 percent to 47 percent, last night’s Erick Aybar steal dropped New York’s win expectancy from 53.1 percent to 52.1 percent. With two outs in the third, it was hardly a game-changer.

Take a look at each of the stolen bases so far the Yanks have allowed this season, and their corresponding win probability added values. Even with Jacoby Ellsbury’s stolen bases and an error on the same play that allowed him to move to third, the Yanks have lost just 0.155 WPA points – or 15.5 percent of a win – by catching just one out of 13 base stealers. A few more runners gunned out will easily negate that positive advantage.

Player Outcome WPA
Aybar SB 0.01
Wood SB 0.026
Izturis SB 0.006
Abreu CS -0.028
Bartlett SB 0.023
Crawford SB 0.021
Longoria SB 0.015
Zobrist SB 0.004
Upton SB 0.019
Bartlett SB 0.001
Crawford SB 0.001
Ellsbury SB + Error 0.047
Beltre SB 0.01
Total   0.155

My fears for the season though aren’t in the potential for a single stolen base to be a game-changer. Rather, it is in the sheer number of stolen bases the Yanks may allow. So far, Jorge Posada hasn’t shown much on his arm this year, and we can’t be too surprised. He’s 38 – two years removed from shoulder surgery – and has always been an offensive force first and a defensive catcher second. His current 1.147 OPS makes it easy to forget about his defense.

Yet, right now, any time a player with a modicum of speed reaches first base, Posada will be tested. Other than Andy Pettitte, Yankee pitchers aren’t adept at holding runners on, and Posada’s arm will only encourage opposing managers to run. While it’s unsurprising to see Ellsbury, Barlett and Crawford attempt steals, Adrian Beltre ran only 15 times in 2009. He’s a player who will test Posada this year.

The Yanks know their limitations. Joe Girardi will try to get Cervelli into as many games as he can over the course of the season both for defensive purposes and to keep Jorge fresh. Additionally, it’s far too early in the season for us to make major pronouncements on the team’s deficiencies, but as the season gets older, keep an eye on those stolen bases. One or two may end up coming back to haunt the Yanks yet.

Categories : Analysis, Defense
Comments (65)

It’s tough to find controversy when a team goes 4-2 in its first two series, defeating both of its toughest division rivals. It becomes even tougher when the team scores 36 runs in those six games and has won convincingly in the two latest contests. Still, there is one issue that seems to have some Yanks fans wondering. It’s a minor issue, but an issue nonetheless. It appears, at least for the time being, that Joe Girardi will platoon Brett Gardner and Marcus Thames.

When we heard about the possibility earlier this month I didn’t think much of it. Why, I wondered, would the Yankees sacrifice so much on defense just to get Thames’s bat into the lineup? Yet when they faced their first lefty of the season, Jon Lester on Tuesday evening, Thames’s name was on the lineup card. It appeared again on Friday night when David Price took the mound for the Rays. The decision came back to bite them that evening, as Thames couldn’t run down a Jason Bartlett liner to center, which allowed two more Rays to score in an abhorrent fourth inning.

So will the Yankees continue to employ this platoon?

For now, I imagine the team wants to see if they can get anything out of Thames. The only way to do that, so they think, is to play up Thames’s skills. Well, we can really make that singular, since Thames has one skill, power, and he flashes it most proficiently against left-handed pitching. If Thames, then, is going to be of any use to this team, he’s going to have to hit against lefties. Hence the early season trial. I suspect, however, that it won’t last too long.

I don’t love the math in Greg Fertel’s analysis. It uses MLE stats, which don’t necessarily correlate to major league numbers, and it uses defensive projections. While these are better methods than pulling numbers out of thin air, they also leave plenty of room for error. Those issues aside, I think Greg has a good overall point, and one that I tried to make in Friday’s recap. Thames would have to hit a ton off lefties in order to justify his playing time.

Gardner saves runs with his glove, many more than Thames. He will also produce a non-zero average against lefties. Thames will allow many more balls to drop, balls which Gardner would catch. At the plate he might produce better, but in order to determine his value we have to look at his production over Gardner’s, and then look at his production under Gardner’s in the field. Without running through projection numbers, I’m fairly certain that the runs Gardner saves will be worth more than the runs Thames creates, even if Thames actually starts hitting lefties.

Still, Thames figures to get a few more shots against lefties. It’s tough to just on just a few plate appearances, especially early in the year. I understand where the Yankees are coming from in wanting to see if Thames can provide value to the team. The ultimate answer, I believe, will involve Thames being reduced to a pinch-hitting role — and an eventual ouster from the team once they can find a more productive player for his roster spot.

Categories : Defense
Comments (61)

GM Brian Cashman and the rest of the Yankees’ brass have been preaching the mantra of “get younger and more athletic” for years now, and they have done so in each of the last two offseasons. They effectively replaced the trio of Bobby Abreu, Jason Giambi, and Johnny Damon (combined 2010 age: 111) with Nick Swisher, Mark Teixeira, and Curtis Granderson (combined 2010 age: 88) while handing the 26-year-old Brett Gardner something close to a full-time job this year.

The improvement made with this transition is noticeable in more ways than one. First of all, it’s easier on the bottom line, even with Tex’s massive deal. Swisher and Granderson will combine to make $750,000 less this year than what the Yankees paid Damon by himself last year. Secondly, the younger players are less susceptible to the daily aches and pains associated with a 162 game season, and generally recover quicker than players on the wrong side of 35. Durability is a big part of it. For the purposes of this post, we’re going to focus on the third way the young players are an improvement over the old dudes, and that’s defensively.

Last year, the Yankees posted a team UZR of -18.5, 18th best in the game (or more accurately, 12th worst). Sadly, that was a massive improvement from their -44.5 UZR in 2008, which was third worst in all the land. With Damon, and to a lesser extent the perpetually average Melky Cabrera elsewhere this year, the Yankees stand to improve some more on the defensive side of the ball.

Using Jeff Zimmerman’s UZR projections, we can get an idea of how the Yanks’ projected starters for the 2010 season should do with the leather. Remember, these are just projections based on a weighted regression of the last four year’s worth of data, and are in no way predictions. They’re just a fancy estimated guesses, really. The table, obviously, is on the left.

Because we’re looking at the total defensive production from the individual positions in 2009 and comparing it to just the projected starters for the upcoming season, we’re really comparing apples to … slices of apples.  More accurate than oranges, but not whole apples. Guys like Ramiro Pena, Randy Winn, (ugh) Marcus Thames, and who knows who else will make their mark throughout the season, for better or for worse. For us though, this is fine.

The real improvement comes in the outfield, which is good because new fourth starter Javy Vazquez and new fifth starter Phil Hughes are fly ball pitchers, as are bullpen mainstays David Robertson, Damaso Marte, and Al Aceves. Despite his struggles down the stretch last year, Granderson has been an above average defensive centerfielder his entire career, which is what the UZR projections see him being in 2010. Sliding Gardner over to left instantly improves the position, even if he undershoots his projection by a few runs. Nick Swisher will probably be the same Nick Swisher in right, and while it may not always be pretty, it’s still damn effective.

As for the infield, well that crew remains unchanged from last year except for one thing: they’re all a year older. Zimmerman’s projections are age adjusted, which is why they see 36-year-old Derek Jeter‘s defense dropping significantly despite the improvement he’s made in recent seasons. Shortstops that age who don’t decline with the glove are few and far between. Ditto 35-year-old third basemen. I expect Jeter and A-Rod to be collectively below average next year, though I’m hopeful it’ll just be slightly below rather than oh-my-goodness-this-is-Sarah-Jessica-Parker-ugly defense.

Cano and Tex are firmly in the primes of their career, and even though their UZR doesn’t always jive with what our eyes tell us, I think we can all agree they’re no worse than league average as a tandem. The Yankees will be fine on the right side of the infield both offensively and defensively as long as no one gets hurt.

The Yankees have come a long way since 2005, when they trotted out what was arguably the worst defense in baseball history. They’ve managed to do so while importing some long-term pieces on affordable contracts that are more than total zeroes with the bat. They figure to be even better in 2010, which can only help the pitching staff that posted the second best xFIP (4.23) in the American League last season.

Photo Credit: Gene J. Puskar, AP

Categories : Defense
Comments (58)

Via Joel Sherman, the Yankees have decided that Curtis Granderson will start the season as the every day centerfielder, pushing the incumbent Brett Gardner to left. He notes that Granderson’s sometimes awkward routes have improved as camp has progressed, and the Yanks didn’t feel it was enough of an upgrade defensively to make the switch. The move will probably cost the Yankees something like five runs defensively over the course of the season, though we don’t have enough reliable data on Gardner’s defense to say with any certainty.

I guess the biggest thing is just making sure Granderson was comfortable. There’s no need to move him back and forth between center and left depending on who else was playing the outfield on a given day (Gardner, Randy Winn, Marcus Thames), the guy will have enough to get used to in his first season in New York as it is.

Categories : Asides, Defense
Comments (53)


Photo credit: Elise Amendola/AP

Mark Teixeira plays a mean first base. We’ve known this for a while. He quickly established his reputation in Texas, and for six or so games per year from 2003 through the first half of 2007 we got to see it ourselves. He just seems graceful patrolling the bag, snagging tough one-hoppers and picking low throws out of the dirt. In 2009 we got a real treat in watching Teixeira ply his craft every day. He resembled a ballerina compared to his predecessor, Jason Giambi. I think Bob Klapisch nailed it when he described Giambi as being “as graceful as Herman Munster around the bag.”

That quote comes from an article Klapisch wrote about Mark Teixeira’s UZR. For the second time in the past three seasons his UZR fell below the league average. We’ve discussed this issue in the past, and have heard many people claim that the gross misrepresentation of Teixeira’s defense proves that the statistic is useless. This couldn’t be further from the truth. While UZR might not cover everything that makes a first baseman, it still does tell us important things about defensive range.

As I covered in the UZR primer, the statistic is primarily concerned with assigning credit and blame on balls in play and comparing that to the league average. This can cause confusion in zones between two positions, such as second and first base. Maybe Yankees’ opponents hit an inordinate number of balls to that side. Maybe opponents ended up taking two bases, thus hurting Teixeira’s UZR more than a mere single. Maybe he wasn’t positioned optimally. There are plenty of reasons why, in this one season, his UZR — in specific the range component — was below league average.

Again, this does not discredit UZR, but perhaps points out some of its inefficiencies. It doesn’t factor in player positioning, and it certainly doesn’t assign first basemen extra credit for scooping balls out of the dirt. When we look at a first baseman’s UZR, we have to recognize that it will not tell us these things. It will tell us only what goes into it, and that mostly involves how often a player turned a batted ball into an out, in a particular zone, compared to the league average. For the other aspects of manning first base, we’re on our own.

To that end, I don’t think anyone would argue that Teixeira played a poor first base last season. At the very least, everyone was happy enough to see an improvement over Giambi. Yet there is an important point to keep in mind. What we tend to remember are the plays he did make. The one hopper that he snagged as he was falling down. The dive to get a ball headed for the hole. The scoop on a three-bouncer. What we probably don’t remember, what we might not even notice, are the balls he just doesn’t get to. I’m not saying that Teixeira didn’t get to all these grounders that other first baseman would have. I’m saying that it’s possible that he did miss a few plays, and that we don’t remember them because they weren’t particularly noteworthy at the time.

Also keep in mind that UZR works with small samples. How many chances does a first baseman get to field a ball? Fewer than shortstop and second base, and we normally take three years’ worth of UZR data to get a read on those positions. Over the past three years, and for his career, Teixeira’s UZR is positive. It’s not massively so, but he’s certainly not rated below average. I suspect that we’ll see him in the positive again in 2010. These things tend to even out over time.

*Bonus section

Sorry, but I couldn’t let these two utterances, one from Tex and the other from Klapisch, fly by without a comment.

Teixeira: “Look, if computers could run the game, why bother having general managers?” Because you need people to analyze and interpret the data. Also, no one’s arguing that computers should run the game in the first place. Also, scouts have their place, and it’s no marginal, second-class citizen status. Numbers are just a recording of what happened on the field, but we need to go much further in order to make the data useful. Also, there is no such thing as a perfect statistic.

Klapisch: But here’s the kicker: Sabermetrics don’t acknowledge a phenomenon known as “clutch.” Untrue, though Klap isn’t the first to misstate the general sabermetric view of clutch. The idea is that it’s difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. It does make for good storytelling, though, so most staheads have backed off arguing the idea of clutch. If you think a particular player is clutch and another unclutch, fine. It is, after all, your own definition you’re applying to the players.

Categories : Defense
Comments (50)

After the heartbreak of 2004, the Yankees needed a boost in 2005. From all appearances, the team’s biggest trouble in 2004 was its pitching staff. The team lost Andy Pettitte, Roger Clemens, and David Wells after the 2003 season, and replaced them by trading for Kevin Brown and Javier Vazquez. A year earlier they signed Jon Lieber while he was rehabbing from Tommy John surgery, and during Spring Training they signed old friend Orlando Hernandez. Those four, along with Mike Mussina, could have been a formidable rotation had they all been at their best. Of course, things like that never seem to work out in baseball.

In the 2004-2005 off-season, the Yankees blew up the whole project. Brown and Mussina stuck around because of their contracts, but everyone else was out. Lieber left for the Phillies, El Duque signed with the White Sox, and the Yanks traded Javier Vazquez for Randy Johnson. To replace the two departures, the team signed Carl Pavano and Jaret Wright. It was hardly a perfect solution. In fact, it seemed like more of the same, just with different names. Unsurprisingly, the team ERA, while numerically lower in 2005, ranked worse in relation to the league.

Clearly, the Yankees replaced very good pitchers with far inferior ones. In 2003 the staff posted a 3.66 FIP, second in baseball. In 2004 that jumped to 4.27, 12th in the majors. In 2005 it was just about the same, 4.28, but that ranked 15th. For years I thought the conversation ended there. Worse pitchers means a worse pitching staff. Not only were the five starters inferior to the ones in 2003, but injuries forced the Yankees to trot out even worse arms.

But as we learned in 2009, even a team with a middling pitching staff can post a quality ERA if it has quality defenders behind it. The 2009 Mariners posted a team 4.39 FIP, which ranked 9th in the AL. Yet their team ERA of 3.87 was No. 1. The difference was in the team defense. The Mariners posted a team 85.5 UZR, 16 runs better than the next best team. In other words, with a pitching staff perhaps negligibly better than the 2004 and 2005 Yankees teams, the Mariners still managed the top ERA in the AL. (Though, of course, having an ace like Felix certainly helps.)

Defensive stats weren’t widespread in 2003, but if they were perhaps the Yankees would have taken a different approach to rebuilding the pitching staff. The team UZR that year was -62.2, second worst in the majors and worst in the AL. In 2004 that was even worse, -76.3. To put that number into even more grave context, the second worst team, the Red Sox, were at -34.1. Yes, the Yankees defense in 2004 was more than twice as bad as the second worst team. While the pitching staff was not nearly as good as 2003, the worsened defense exacerbated the problem.

Yet that’s nothing compared to 2005. The Yankees, as a team, posted a -137 UZR. That’s a 137-run penalty due to their defense. The second worst team, the Reds, ranked at -67, so once again the Yankees were twice as bad as the next worst team. The second worst AL team, the Royals, ranked -52.4, so the Yankees were even worse when compared to their own league. Finally, to continue with the theme of worst, the -137 UZR is, by far, the worst team UZR since 2002, when we began tracking UZR.

While the Yankees still ranked last in 2006, a -73.9 UZR, they were a bit closer to the next worst team, the Pirates at -53.3. In terms of the AL, however, they could be considered even worse. The White Sox ranked 13th that year at -29.3, putting a huge gap between the two teams. It wasn’t until 2007 that the Yankees started to improve, with a -8.8 UZR, which ranked 21st in the majors. After a step back in 2008, the Yankees jumped up to 19th in the majors in 2009. The defense still isn’t great, not even in the top half of the league. But compared to 2005, they’re a team of Ozzie Smiths.

Photo credit: Kathy Willens/AP

Categories : Defense
Comments (109)