(Jim McIsaac/Getty)

The latest Collective Bargaining Agreement overhauled the draft (and international free agency) and free agency in an attempt to fix long-standing problems, but instead all it did was create a new set of problems. It’s a vicious cycle. Teams are now given soft spending caps with harsh penalties for amateur players, and the qualifying offer system severely limits the market for some free agents. There’s no perfect solution to these problems — no realistic perfect solution, I should say — but Scott Boras has some ideas.

In a guest piece at ESPN earlier this week (subs. req’d), Boras laid out some creative ways to improve the draft and free agency. By improve I mean “make fair,” more than anything. None of his ideas are wacky and all of it passes the sniff test. The entire article is worth a read, but I wanted to touch on the key points separately. Let’s break ‘em down:

Problem: Qualifying offer system limits market for older players
Solution: Players age 31 and older do not require draft pick compensation

Unsurprisingly, Boras uses Kyle Lohse and Adam LaRoche (both his clients) as examples of older players who were hurt by receiving a qualifying offer this past winter. Both guys had strong-to-excellent seasons in 2012 but had trouble finding work on the open market because no one wanted to surrender a first round pick for a guy in his mid-30s. Under Boras’ scenario, a player age 31 or older who received a qualifying offer would net his former team the same compensation pick as any other qualified free agent, however their new team would not forfeit a pick.

I like the idea, but I do think the age threshold may be too low. Thirty-one is still in a guy’s theoretical prime, and a team should have to forfeit a first rounder to sign a prime-aged player. Robinson Cano is a perfect example — he’ll turn 31 in October and is still an elite player, so why shouldn’t a team have to surrender a first pick to sign him? The same would have been true for Nick Swisher last winter. Players like Cano and Swisher, obvious above-average players in their prime, should cost a pick. Maybe 32 or 33 would work better for the age limit.

Problem: Inflexible draft pools with slot values for each pick in the top ten rounds
Solution: No spending limits for the first round

I love this idea. Boras notes the draft talent pool varies from year-to-year, so clubs should be given the flexibility to spend however they see fit with their top selections. If it’s a deep class, they should be able to spend more without being penalized rather than squeezing each draft under the same spending umbrella. Smart teams should be rewarded for identifying the best talent and paying top dollar for it, and the teams with extra picks should be able to take full advantage. I really dislike the draft pool system and feel there should be no slot values at all, but this is a nice compromise. If a good player falls — Boras used Mark Appel (his client, duh) in 2012 as an example — a team should be able to sign him without punting several other picks. Free enterprise, baby.

* * *

Boras also argues young American-born players are at a financial disadvantage compared to Cuban-born players — Stephen Strasburg’s contract ($15.1M) vs. Aroldis Chapman’s contract ($30.25M) at the same age, for example — but I’m not really sure what can be done about that aside from abolishing the draft and going back to true free agency (a.k.a the pre-1965 model). That won’t happen for obvious reasons.

I do think Boras has some good ideas for improving the current system though, particularly with regards to his uncapped first round of the draft plan. Ultimately, the best way to address the qualifying offer problem is to complete sever the ties between free agency and the draft, making them two completely separate events. The current CBA doesn’t expire until after the 2016 season, however, and it’s unlikely MLB and the players’ union will open it back up to address any non-performance-enhancing drug related issue. The owners have no reason to cave on that stuff right now.

Before the players even reported for spring training, we all knew that 2013 would prove a challenging season for the Yankees. A rash of injuries and setbacks in April only worsened the situation. Yet the team, largely on the back of the pitching staff, persevered through those challenges. After defeating the Rays on May 25, they owned the second-best record in the AL and sat atop the AL East at 30-18.

From there it has been all downhill.

Since then the Yankees are 27-38 with a -49 run differential. In the AL that’s only better than the White Sox and the Astros. Even the Blue Jays, still in the AL East cellar, have played over .500 ball since that date.

The easy narrative is that the pitching staff, which propped up the Yanks through those first 48 games (they allowed the second fewest runs in the AL, 3 behind Texas), fell apart in June, July, and now August. To a degree that’s true. In the first 48 games they allowed 3.73 runs per game, as opposed to 4.13 in the 65 games since. That amounts to 26 runs in those 65 games, which would have led to at least a few more wins.

Yet it is the offensive drop-off that has killed the 2013 Yankees. In those first 48 games they scored 4.33 runs per game, far from the best in the league but at least adequate given the stellar pitching. In the last 65 games they have scored nearly one fewer run per game. That amounts to fewer than every other team in the AL — by 19 runs — and is topped (bottomed?) only by the Giants with 210 runs since then. In other words, the offense was below average, but adequate, to start the season. It has evolved into a unit that the 1991 team might recognize.

These are the facts of the situation. After performing well to start the season — performing well without Curtis Granderson, Derek Jeter, Alex Rodriguez, Mark Teixeira, and Kevin Youkilis, among others — the team has completely fallen off a cliff. At this point there is little, if any, hope that they turn it around. Last month they needed at least two bats, plus the healthy return of their own players, to have a chance. What they got was another player in his late 30s who is under contract for next year. And that’s it.

(As an aside, the Soriano trade does irk me a bit. If he were one of two or three moves made before the deadline, when improvements might have made a significant difference, that’s one thing. But to acquire him and only him makes the trade feel like a complete waste. Corey Black might be no shining star, but you wouldn’t up and release him, would you? Yet they ended up giving him away for a player who won’t help the team win in 2013, and stands little chance of helping in 2014. I really wish the Yanks had waited until the 31st to move on Soriano, and would have declined to do so after seeing that there were no other moves to make. Then again, apparently this was an ownership move. Hooray!)

We’re right to hope for miracles, but we’re also right to step back and see the team for what it has become. In order to make up the seven — seven! — games that sit between Yanks and the Rangers/A’s, they’ll need literally everything to come together immediately. That includes Robinson Cano getting hot, A-Rod and Granderson hitting their strides, Derek Jeter to successfully return, David Adams to prove a competent platoon partner with Lyle Overbay (or they could acquire Mark Reynolds for the same effect), Vernon Wells to keep hitting like he has since July 1, and significant performance improvements from Ichiro and Soriano. It might even involve Travis Hafner coming back and hitting like he did in April.

At the same time, it would involve CC Sabathia righting the ship, Andy Pettitte showing that he’s not completely washed up, Ivan Nova continuing his impressive run since being recalled, and David Phelps successfully returning from his two forearm strains*. I’ll take a moment while you step back and ponder all that.

*I could say it also involves Phil Hughes pitching consistently well, but the man is in the bottom 10 percent of qualified AL starters in terms of ERA for the last three years. Even if you add in 2010, he’s still in the bottom 10 percent. I’m willing to root for miracles, but I have to remain somewhat realistic.

Some of that might end up as the best case scenario. But that’s not enough for the 2013 Yankees. They need at least 80 percent of those events to reach their best cases, and even 80 percent might not be enough. How many times in the past have we seen this many things go well, all in sync, for a team that has played so poorly? Even in 2011, the Rays had played far better baseball at this point than the Yankees have, and needed plenty of help to get back in.

I want to hope. I really do. The April-May Yankees were downright fun to watch. It wasn’t always pretty, but they came back late in games, showed some guile, and got some phenomenal starting pitching efforts (even a few from Mr. Hughes). Since then, though, they’ve done little but let us down. I don’t want to give up on the season, but considering the hefty obstacles that face this team if it wants to crawl back into the race, it’s perhaps better for my mental health if I do.

Imagen Yankez have all hom grown pleyerz.* Seriously, it’s a neat little exercise to go back and see what current major league players went through the Yankees system. Thankfully, Scranton RailRiders beat writer Donnie Collins has saved us some time and put together such a list himself. If nothing else, it’s a nice little thought experiment.

*You’ll have to follow @Seinfeld2000 to get the joke.

Without further pontification, here’s Collins’s list, complete with commentary and other goodies.

Starting Pitching

Andy Pettitte
Phil Hughes
Ian Kennedy
Ivan Nova
Jose Quintana

Disabled List: Manny Banuelos, Jeff Karstens, David Phelps, Vidal Nuno

The best (current) pitcher on this list might not even technically qualify, depending on how you define homegrown talent. Quintana originally signed with the Mets as an international free agent in 2006, but they released him while he served a drug suspension in 2007. The Yankees signed him before the 2008 season, but then let him walk after the 2011 season. He was pitching successfully in the majors the next year.

Even if you count Quintana as a homegrown talent, it’s not as though it’s some developmental win. He’s arguably the best (current) pitcher on this list — certainly is in terms of results for the last two years — and the Yankees got nothing from or for him.

None of these pitchers rates in the top 30 in ERA among qualified starters for the last three years. The highest is Ian Kennedy at No. 46. On the flip side, Phil Hughes ranks No. 103, out of 112, in ERA during the last three years.

The disabled list doesn’t really mitigate this situation at all. Karstens is a fringy guy, obviously better off in the NL than in the AL. Phelps has been useful, but more on the level of Nova than above the level of Quintana. We still await the arrival of Banuelos; it seems the guys is constantly facing setbacks in his development.

Relief Pitching

Mariano Rivera
David Robertson
Tyler Clippard
Mark Melancon
Mike Dunn
Phil Coke
Randy Choate
Adam Warren

You could probably go a few different ways with this list, since the Yankees have developed a goodly number of relievers. If you count Quintana, you could also count Jose Veras, who is having a fine season. There’s also Joba Chamberlain — whomighthaveremainedastarterunderdifferentcircumstancesbutthat’sbeyondthepoint — who has been good in the past but is having a really poor season that makes his overall numbers look that much worse.

Here the Yankees do have some clout. Rivera, Robertson, and Clippard all rank in the top 30 among relievers in ERA for the last three seasons. Melancon ranks in the top half and is on the rise. Dunn, Coke, and Choate form a decent cadre of lefties. Warren has shown that he’s a pretty good long man, at the least.

Yet again we find a blunder, though. While Coke and Dunn were both traded in large-scale transactions, Clippard got shipped out of town for Jonathan Albaladejo, which I’m sure Brian Cashman ranks as one of his worst trades. That’s not to mention how much Ramon Ramirez could have helped in the past.

Infield

1B: David Adams
2B: Robinson Cano
3B: Jimmy Paredes
SS: Eduardo Nunez
1B: Shelley Duncan

Disabled List: Derek Jeter, Corban Joseph, Ramiro Pena

Is there need for much commentary on the infield? Robinson Cano has been a phenomenal developmental success, especially at the major league level. He went from a guy whom the Rangers and Diamondbacks snubbed as a trade chip in 2004 to a veritable star by 2010.

And then we have the rest of the list.

After a hot 180 PA to start his career, Paredes has predictably stunk. Nunez has potential, and you can see it in nearly every swing he takes. It’s pretty, and it produces some of the hardest hit frozen ropes you’ll see. To date, it has failed to produce results worthy of an MLB starter. Adams still has potential, but he hasn’t done himself any favors in the bigs. I will refrain from commenting on Duncan.

Jeter obviously represents a developmental success, though that development occurred two decades ago, while Cashman was a mere peon in the organization and his staff wasn’t even with the team. Joseph could be decent, but lacks an arm to play 3B and so probably has no future with the organization. Pena was having a good year in part-time duty before getting hurt, but it’s not as though he’s going to be some surprise star.

Outfield

Brett Gardner
Austin Jackson
Alfonso Soriano
Jose Tabata

Disabled List: Zoilo Almonte, Melky Cabrera

This isn’t the worst group in the world, though there isn’t much power to speak of. Jackson is no superstar, but he did produce a solid rookie year and a standout season in 2012. Outside of that he’s been a little below average, which is fine for a center fielder with his kind of range. He and Gardner would prevent plenty of fly balls from dropping in.

The curious case here is Tabata, who earned Manny Ramirez comps while in the minors — and that’s a direct lesson to not comp minor leaguers to superstars. He’s been adequately above average for the Pirates in three of his four seasons to date, but like his Yankee-developed brethren he doesn’t hit for any power. Soriano is the only source of power here, and once again he’s not a true developmental success, since the Yankees signed him as a free agent after he played in Japan for a bit.

Catcher

Dioner Navarro
Austin Romine

Suspended and/or Injured: Francisco Cervelli, Jesus Montero

Again, a section that defies comment. The Yankees have had a pipeline of catchers, and none has really worked out. It does make me wonder what might have become, had Cervelli put his damn hand behind his back instead of leaving it prone and having a foul ball break it.

So…

The roster above does not provide much inspiration. Collins wondered how it compared to the product actually on the field, and I think it’s pretty clear that the 2013 Yankees are a bit better than this crew.

Teams are built in many different ways, though, and an all-homegrown team ignores the Yankees greatest competitive advantage: money. So it makes sense, in a way, that they haven’t developed an elite corps of big league players. With money to burn on high-tier players, it’s not necessary.

Then again, a necessary cousin to spending on high-tier players is trading prospects for established talent. The Yankees have done this, and really haven’t surrendered all that much in the way of helpful big leaguers. But their track record suggests that teams aren’t getting a whole lot in return. I’m not sure if this turns teams away from dealing with the Yankees, but it certainly can’t help.

The landscape is changing as well. Players are opting for security over top dollar, signing extensions with their current teams that leave them off free agency lists at ages when it might make sense to sign them to long-term contracts. When they do hit free agency it could be in their early- to mid-30s, a time when long-term contracts become far, far riskier.

In the past, this kind of development had worked. In the future, it will not. Therefore, people railing against Cashman and the front office in the comments — an inevitability in nearly any post but a 100 percent certainty on this one — miss the point. How the Yankees have performed in the past in terms of player development does not necessarily reflect how they will perform in the future. In the past they didn’t need to emphasize development because of their other advantages. Now that players and teams have changed their behaviors, the Yankees will have to adapt in kind.

Which is to say that they have to do better if they want to avoid a long period of losing teams. The old methods just don’t work as well.