When I heard earlier this week that the Blue Jays were prepared to trade Roy Halladay, six names ran through my head: Jason Jarvis, Mike Gordon and Marty Jenzen. David Wells, Homer Bush and Graeme Lloyd.

The names represent extremes of the trade spectrum and relate, as we know, to two blockbuster trades between the Jays and the Yankees. The first three were the package of prospects the Yanks sent to the Blue Jays in 1995 for David Cone. That would be a coup for the Yanks as Cone would win four World Series rings with the Bombers, and none of those three would amount to much. The second three were for Roger Clemens prior to the 1999 season. The legacy of that trade is best left to other posts.

As the rumors have grown surrounding Halladay — you can find the latest here on MLBTR — I pondered a post about the prior trades involving the Blue Jays and ace. So did Mark Feinsand. Since there’s no need to reinvent the wheel, we shall examine Feinsand’s charge that the three situations are not alike.

On Cone:

It’s hard to believe that’s all Toronto got for Cone, but don’t forget that he had only been in Toronto for three months when they traded him. He wasn’t the institution that Halladay is. Still, they should have gotten much more for him.

It should also be noted that this took place just months after the 1994 strike, and Cone’s $8 million salary was second-highest in the American League, so the Jays were probably happy enough to dump the free-agent-to-be once they were out of the race. Halladay is signed for another year, so there isn’t the same desperation to get rid of him.

On Clemens:

As for Clemens, the Yankees traded a package led by David Wells to get the Rocket, who had requested a trade and left the Blue Jays with very limited options based on his no-trade clause. If you want to equate that to present-day, the Yankees would have to send Toronto a package led by A.J. Burnett to get Halladay. I’m pretty sure that won’t happen.

Feinsand is on the money with Clemens, but I think the Cone comparisons are slightly closer than he thinks. As they did in 1995, the Blue Jays, a franchise treading water, want salary relief. But, unlike in 1995, their fans know the value of Halladay, and they will have to land more than just three no-names who aren’t going to amount to much.

Earlier this morning, rumors swirled that the Blue Jays asked for a package of three players consisting of Joba Chamberlain or Phil Hughes, Mark Melancon, and Austin Jackson or Jesus Montero. Clearly, J.P. Ricciardi has his intra-division sights set high, and that’s where things stand. The Yankees will not acquire Halladay, and I highly doubt the Red Sox will either. Philadelphia seems to be the likely destination with Texas far behind. The history of Toronto Blue Jays starting pitcher trades will, sadly, probably not repeat itself.

Yesterday’s news concerning the Blue Jays’ willingness to trade Roy Halladay sparked a fire storm of conversation among baseball fans around the nation. With that announcement, Halladay became the most sought-after July name, and early indications are that he would waive his no-trade clause for New York, Philadelphia or Boston. My money is on Halladay’s landing in Philadelphia, but we can’t count out the Yankees.

Yesterday, in writing about the potential for a trade, Joe mostly summed up my take on it:

What about acquiring him? Rosenthal notes that Ricciardi would deal within the division, though we all know there’s a premium there. Any package would probably have to start with Phil Hughes, and then include one of the Yanks’ precious few bats, likely one of the catchers. Would Hughes, Romine, and a third prospect, probably of the top-10 variety, be enough to land Halladay? Would the Yankees be wise to make such a move?

There’s no doubt that acquiring Halladay would leave the Yankees with the best rotation in baseball. In the short term, they’d be as well off as any other team, probably better off. In the long term they’d be giving up prospects, sure, but prospects can bust. It looks like Phil Hughes is finding his way, and it would probably suck to face him four or five times a year. But it wouldn’t be nearly as bad as facing Halladay that many times.

I’d add a caveat: Considering their respective ages, Phil Hughes could be a thorn in opponents’ sides longer than Halladay may be. Furthermore, as many have pointed out over the last 24 hours, if Brian Cashman opted 18 months ago to avoid sending Hughes and others to the Twins for a younger Johan Santana also with one year left on his contract, why would he do the same with Halladay? (Santana, by the way, has a 5.12 ERA over his last 10 starts with some bad peripherals. Meanwhile, Fangraphs posits that J.P. Ricciardi will not only ask for the sky for Halladay but deserves it as well. Roy is just that good.)

While we’ll be hearing a lot about Halladay and other potential trade targets over the next few months, I noticed an interesting thread in the comments from Yankee fans who were discussing potential deals yesterday. In light of a few bad starts and some thoughtless comments to the media, Joba Chamberlain isn’t as untouchable in the eyes of the fans as he once was. That’s an odd and confounding sea change in fan opinion, and I’m willing to discount it as the frustrations of a fan base expecting their 23-year-old stud to be lights out right away.

Anyway, these comments and the general state of trade rumors made me ponder the question of untouchables. As fans, we overvalue our prospects, but who among the Yankee farm hands is truly untouchable? Jesus Montero fronts that list. In two levels this year and at just 19 years of age, he is hitting .336/.391/.556. A young hitter who is, for now, a catcher such as Montero doesn’t come around that often, and the Yanks should hold on to that one.

Beyond Montero, I would also add Joba Chamberlain and Phil Hughes to that list. While both are clearly works in progress, they have shown the ability at a young age to get hitters out by way of the K. Hughes had shown his potential pitching out of the pen this year, and we know what Joba, when 100 percent healthy and on, can do with his high-90s fastball. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Yankees stopped developing young cost-controlled pitching to complement their free agent signings. With Joba and Phil, they can do just that.

Beyond that, though, anyone is fair game. The Austins — Romine and Jackson — both have a lot of potential, but both feature some red flags as well. Romine’s on-base percentage is just .316 at A+, and Jackson is striking out a lot. Keith Law, in particular, has accused fans of over-projecting A-Jax. For the right package, I would trade either. Other prospects are certainly movable too.

In the end, this boils down the simple reality that the Yankees must know when to trade from a strength. They have catching depth, and they have pitching depth in their farm system right now. Both of those are commodities, and either could land the Yanks a big fish. The next 23 days will be as interesting as they always are, and the Yanks should make some splashes. We’ll suffer through some separation anxiety, but with the right moves, it should be well worth it.

Nothing irks sports fans more than concession prices. Inside of a stadium, everything costs more. A beer you might buy for $5 at a sports bar costs $9 or even $11 inside the stadium. A steak sandwich that sells for $8 can go for as much as $15. Even New Era Hats, priced at a steep $34 at the flagship store, can go for $40 inside the stadium.

Meanwhile, fans like to justify the prices and their ballpark expenses by blaming — or celebrating — the payroll. Yankee fans are willing to pay so much for concessions because the team has a $200 million payroll, and that lofty total demonstrates the Steinbrenners’ devotion to winning. Or so it goes.

In the Wall Street Journal this week, Allen Barra, he of the excellent Yogi Berra biography, challenges that assumption. Prices inside a stadium are high, he says, because a stadium is a natural monopoly with a captive audience. Barra writes:

The point is that prices go up because the owners think that’s what you’re willing to pay. If you are willing to pay, the price stays high. If you aren’t — or at least if enough of you aren’t — then the price will come back down. It’s that simple.

The athletes and their agents don’t determine the price of tickets, souvenirs and food. Not even the owners determine them. Well, they sort of do when it comes to the food. The hamburger joint across the street from the park probably charges half of what you pay at the game, but that’s because the ball club has a monopoly. In general, though, you are the ones who set the prices for T-shirts and baseball hats.

It may take a while but eventually, if baseball management has overpriced its commodities, consumers — that’s you, the fans — will show them their error and the prices will come down. If you are willing to pay their prices that means they set the right prices after all.

It is a very valid argument, but Barra obscures his point by the end. He says that if society were to stop spending as much at baseball stadiums, then prices and salaries would go down. There is, it seems, a cause-and-effect problem. If salaries don’t determine how much a team can charge, then why would cutting fan spending reduce salaries?

In reality, salaries do have an impact on how teams set their prices. The teams need to generate a certain margin to cover their expenses. For the Yankees, that includes a lofty payroll and luxury tax payments. While revenue from TV deals and licensed merchandise sales cover some of that, the rest is captured through ticket sales and in-stadium concession deals.

Where the monopoly takes over though is in the profit space above the margin. Once the Yankees recover the payroll and luxury tax figures, anything they make above that is pure profit that can be pocketed or reinvested in the team in future years. If that $15 cheese steak were $12 instead, the Yanks’ would probably be covering their costs and more. But since fans are willing to pay $15 for it, the Yankees will continue to charge that much, pocketing the profits as any company would.