Did intentional walks help the Yankees in 2010?

A lot of baseball’s little nuances annoy me, none more than sacrifice bunt. A close second is the intentional walk however, just because I’m generally opposed to giving the other team free baserunners since it increases their chances of winning. Don’t get me wrong, it definitely has a time and a place, but I do think it’s used a bit too liberally these days.

Joe Girardi and the Yankees’ coaching staff had their pitchers intentionally walk 36 batters during the 2010 regular season, some of which ended up working out okay and some of which completely blew up in their faces. This post is going to take a look at those free passes and the resulting win probability swing. To do this, I’m going to compare the win expectancy after the batter after the IBB to the win expectancy before the IBB. The logic is that the batter was put on base intentionally so the pitcher could (theoretically) face the inferior batter behind him, so what that second guy does is what’s important. Follow? Good. It’s like Mark Teixeira getting walked to face Alex Rodriguez; I’m comparing the win expectancy before Tex’s at-bat to the win expectancy after A-Rod’s, since that will tell us if the intentional walk “worked,” so to speak. If it improved the team’s chances of winning great, if not, then damn.

Here are the four most significant intentional walk events of the 2010 season, split into good and bad…

Biggest Gain: Sept. 19th, Kerry Wood vs. Nick Markakis
You probably remember this game, it was the one when Luke Scott homered off Mariano Rivera leading off the ninth inning to tie the game, which the Yankees eventually lost in extras. In an inning before that, Boone Logan was summoned from the pen to face a pair of lefties, the punchless Corey Patterson and the slightly dangerous Matt Wieters. Patterson bunted up the first base line for a hit and then Wieters slapped one through the 3.5 hole for a single to put men on the corners with no outs and the Yanks up by two.

Logan gave way to Kerry Wood, who promptly allowed a run scoring single to Felix Pie. Brian Roberts sacrificed the two runners over for reasons unknown, then Wood got Robert Andino swinging for out number two. At this point the Yankees’ win expectancy was 66.5%. Joe Girardi waved the four fingers and had his setup man load the bases intentionally. After the IBB to Markakis, the Yanks win expectancy was 63.9%. Adam Jones bailed them out in no time, flying out to left on the first pitch to end the inning and the threat. The Yanks’ win expectancy after Jones’ at-bat was 83.7%, meaning the total win probability shift of the intentional walk event was 17.2% (83.7%-66.5%).

Honorable Mention: July 4th, David Robertson vs. Lyle Overbay
This was the Marcus Thames walk-off broken bat single game, which I’m sure is fresh in everyone’s memory. Oddly enough, this game featured a Mo blown save as well. In between the blown save and Thames’ heroics, David Robertson ran into a little trouble in the tenth inning. Jose Bautista hit a rare non-homer, leading off the frame with a bloop single. Adam Lind then walked after a seven pitch at-bat, but was erased at second when Edwin Encarnacion bunted into a 5-6-4 double play (Robbie Cano was covering first because Mark Teixeira charged the bunt). That left Bautista at third and two out in the inning.

At this point, the Yankees had a 52.7% chance of winning, but after intentionally walking Lyle Overbay to bring Jose Molina to the plate, they were down to just a 50.8% chance of winning. Robertson got Molina to flail at strike three, ending the inning with the Yankees at a 65.6% chance of being victorious. Five batters later, Thames did his thing. The total win probability shift of the intention walk encounter: 12.9%.

Biggest Loss: July 10th, Joba Chamberlain vs. Russell Branyan
This is an ugly game that no one wants to remember. The Yankees managed to scratch a run off Felix Hernandez and led one-zip into the eighth inning thanks to seven brilliant innings from Javy Vazquez. Go figure. Things got ugly fast after that.

Jack Wilson led off the eighth with a single, but he was erased at second on an Ichiro infield chopper. Chone Figgins singled to move Ichiro over to second, and the pair moved up another base on a wild pitch. At that point, the Yankees had a 48.2% chance of winning, but after Russell Branyan was intentionally walked to load the based with one out, it dropped a bit to 47.8%. Three pitches later, Jose Lopez hit a grand slam, and the Yankees’ win expectancy fell all the way down to just 2.1%. The total change in win probability from the start of Branyan’s at-bat to end of Lopez’s was a staggering 46.1%, all in the wrong direction.

Honorable Mention: May 1st, David Robertson vs. Carlos Quentin
I honestly don’t remember this game at all, but the Yankees were up by a run heading into the seventh inning. Andruw Jones made a quick out to start the inning, but then Paul Konerko doubled to put the tying run in scoring position. Robertson got a weak groundout from Mark Teahen, forcing the ChiSox captain to remain at second. He was then ordered to put Quentin on first base intentionally with the Yankees having a 72.1% chance of winning.

Once the free pass was issued, Damaso Marte was summoned to face the lefty hitting A.J. Pierzynski with the Yanks’ win expectancy at 69.3%. Pierzynski doubled into the left-centerfield gap, allowing both Konerko (tying run) and Teahen (go-ahead run) to score. The chances of a Yankee win dropped all the way to 34.7% after that, meaning the win probability swing was 37.4% in the negative.

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Like I said, I’m generally opposed to the intentional walk but it has it’s moments. Putting Miguel Cabrera on base to face whoever is behind him with the tying run in scoring position is a no-brainer, you’ll take your chances with the next guy just because Miggy is that damn good. There’s also the case when you’re on the road and the winning run is at third and you’re creating the force at any base. The guys on first and second don’t matter, so who cares, put them on and make the play at home easier. Then you have pitchers in the National League, which is another animal all together. That said, I still think it’s a widely overused strategy in the game today. I just hate giving the other team free baserunners.

The full table of intentional walk data for the 2010 Yankees is after the jump for space reasons, but I’m going to throw some notes here…

• The total WPA swing of Yankees’ intentional walks in 2010 was just -.034, meaning that they lost just less than four-hundredths of a win over the course of the season due to putting men on base intentionally. Peanuts.
• Of the 36 intentional walks the Yankees issued in 2010, a whopping 25 improved the team’s chances of winning. However, the average WPA of those 25 was just +.053, or barely more than five percent of a win. The average WPA of the remaining 11 was -.125, which means they hurt the Yanks more than twice as much as the good IBB’s helped, on average.
• Twenty-one of 36 IBB came with the Yankees trailing in the game, and I’m not sure I like that. If you’re trying to catch up and the tie the game, the last thing you want to do is give the opponent more baserunners. Nine of the remaining 15 IBB came with the game tied, and the same logic still applies.
• Some of the awful hitters the Yanks intentionally walked in 2010: Jeff Francoeur, Scott Moore, Jason Kendall, Jason Donald, and Erick Aybar. Le sigh.

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Legend and stuff:

• RoB: Runners on base, with -2- meaning a man on second only, -23 meaning men are on second and third, etc.
• WE1: Win expectancy immediately before the intentional walk.
• WE2: Win expectancy immediately after the intentional walk.
• WE3: Win expectancy immediately after the batter after the intentional walk.
• WPA Swing: WE3-WE1, which essentially tells us if the intentional walk “worked.” If it’s positive, it increased the Yankees chances of winning. If it’s negative … you get the idea.