I’m pinch-hitting for Mike again, and I have thirteen questions to work with. As always, you can send your questions to RABmailbag (at) gmail (dot) com and we’ll get to as many as we can each week.

Steve asks: The Players Association is floating the idea of having less team control in the next CBA. I think owners would welcome the chance to determine what they want to pay rather than have an arbitrator decide for them especially given the recent weak free agent markets.

Do players fare better in their last year of arbitration than they do as free agents in recent years?

It kind of remains to be seen, doesn’t it?

Bryce Harper ($21.625 MM) and Manny Machado ($16 MM) should be locks to do better in free agency than they did last year, but it remains to be seen if that’ll happen. If I had to guess, I still think they’ll both do better – but I’m less confident about Harper besting last year’s salary than I was even a few weeks ago.

Last off-season, the top-tier free agents almost unanimously bested their salaries from their final year of arbitration eligibility. J.D Martinez, Eric Hosmer, and Jake Arrieta all fared significantly better in terms of AAV, as did Alex Cobb and Zack Cozart (albeit with much less money overall). The lone exception is Mike Moustakas, who ended up taking a $3.2 MM paycut in re-signing with the Royals on March 10.

It’s difficult to draw parallels to the top-tier free agents this off-season, as precious few of them have actually signed. The largest contracts have shook out as follows:

• Patrick Corbin made $7.5 MM in 2018, and his new contract will pay him an AAV of $23.333 MM over the next six years.
• Nathan Eovaldi is something of a unique case, given his injuries, but he did well, too, jumping from $2 MM last year to $17 MM per season through 2022.
• A.J. Pollock made $7.75 MM last year, and will earn a minimum of $13.75 MM per year for the next four years.
• Andrew McCutchen is coming off of a team-friendly contract extension, and will earn about $2 MM more per year.
• Zack Britton received a $1 MMish raise over the next three years.
• J.A. Happ received a $4 MMish raise over his previous free agent contract.

It has unfolded in a similar manner – lest we forget that Jake Arrieta didn’t sign until March last year – which sees players getting raises, but only the upper-echelon players receiving significantly more. However, the mid-level free agents have been squeezed in back-to-back off-seasons now; and it isn’t just traditional free agents.

Over the past two off-seasons, we have seen Mike Fiers (121 ERA+ in 172.0 IP), Matt Adams (115 OPS+ in 367 PA), Jared Hughes (146 ERA+ in 59.2 IP), Derek Dietrich (112 OPS+ in 551 PA), Wilmer Flores (107 OPS+ in 429 PA), and Blake Parker (128 OPS+ in 66.1 IP) non-tendered coming off of solid seasons, despite relatively minuscule arbitration figures. And those of them that did end up signing ended up receiving less than their estimated arbitration figures; it’s a disconcerting trend, to say the least.

The short version of this long-winded nonsense is that most players that go from their final year of arbitration eligibility to free agency tend to get a pay raise, though it’s often comparatively modest.

Bob asks: Great job on the Prospect List! I noticed that many of the power arms have command, control or third pitch issues and may be headed for future relief roles. Hitting generally can be taught (i.e. launch angle, backspin, plate discipline) and improved through at-bats. Is it more difficult to teach command, etc.? While relievers are valuable, guys who can go through the lineup 2-3 times are more valuable. Wouldn’t a focus on command and multiple pitches rather than selecting big kids who can throw a ball through a brick wall garner more starting pitchers?

It is an almost universally-held belief that command is the most difficult thing to teach a baseball player. It’s not just a matter of teaching a pitcher how to locate; it involves overhauling mechanics, changing speeds, accounting for the movement in one’s pitches, and the like. It’s something that pitching coaches try to work on at every level, but it’s incredibly difficult to do.

I base this on nothing by my own observations and anecdotal evidence, but it seems like experience is the only thing that can truly teach command. Randy Johnson was pushing 30 when he harnessed his control, and the command came shortly thereafter. Bartolo Colon didn’t become an artist at the corners until he was in his 30s, either. It’s not all that uncommon to see that sort of thing click as a pitcher learns his craft at the highest level – but that’s not really an answer, either.

David asks (short version): The proposed three batter rule will have a significant effect on teams like the Yankees that like to have a defined inning for each reliever. Under the current system, assume Sevy goes 7.1 innings before tiring or reaching his maximum pitch count. Assuming the score is close, the Yankees would go to Dellin for the last two outs of the 8th. They would then go to Chapman in the 9th. Under the new rule, if Dellin faced 2 batters and got 2 outs, they couldn’t go to Chapman in the 9th because Dellin didn’t face his third required batter. Don’t you think this qualifies as a huge impact on the Yankees?

This is actually a common misconception that I’ve been seeing all over Twitter and other blogs. The three-batter minimum, as per ESPN’s Jeff Passan, “[t]he rule would apply to all pitchers, except in instances in which pitchers finish an inning or are injured, sources said.” Therefore, in this particular situation Betances would be free and clear after those two outs.

Rob asks: Why do you think the yankees were willing to pull the trigger on Stanton (a weak defensive outfielder they didn’t really need) instead of waiting for Machado (gold glove 3B they need) for a very similar AAV?

Stanton isn’t – or wasn’t – a bad defensive outfielder. UZR/150 has him as 5.1 runs above-average in right for his career, and DRS/150 has him at roughly 7.0 runs saved per year. And that’s in 8590 inning out there, so it’s a very compelling sample size. He looked bad at times in left last year, to be sure, but he was learning a new position in a new park with a new team, so I’d hazard that his struggles are understandable.

I also don’t think it’s quite fair to say that the Yankees didn’t really need him. They had a void at DH, and he was the reigning (and deserving) NL MVP. Stanton was certainly something of a luxury – but can’t you say the same thing about Machado now, given how well Miguel Andujar played last year? Machado’s a big upgrade, but so was Stanton over Jacoby Ellsbury or whoever else they would’ve trotted out to DH.

And the AAV isn’t necessarily similar. Stanton’s luxury tax hit for the Yankees is around $22 MM for the entirety of his deal, due to the money chipped-in by the Marlins. We don’t yet know what Machado will earn, so it’s difficult to make a comparison – but most folk felt that he was a lock for $30 MM+.

Now, as to the why of all of this: I don’t know that they go hand-in-hand. The Yankees, despite whatever statements to the contrary, have the money to sign Machado. The issue is that they’re functioning on self-imposed austerity. More to the point, though, Stanton was available last off-season for scraps, and he made a great deal of sense at the time. Without Stanton, do they break 100 wins and make it to the ALCS last year? Probably not.

Frank asks: I was looking over the PECOTA projections and 3 things struck me as odd.

1.  LeMahieu’s 3.0 WARP
2.  Voit’s          1.3 FRAA
3.  Hicks’          -7.3 FRAA

Are any of those projections really valid based on each player’s history?

LeMahieu stands out the most to me, as PECOTA projects him to slash .290/.358/.417 in 594 PA, which is superior to what he did last year in fewer plate appearances … and he posted 4.2 WARP in 2018. The issue, however, seems to be entirely tied to defense: he had 20.1 FRAA last year, and they’re projecting 6.2 FRAA in 2019. Is that fair? Maybe. FRAA had him as a scratch defender from 2013 through 2016, so it’s not shocking to see quite a bit of regression there – especially when they also forecast him bouncing between three positions.

Voit’s defense is interesting, because the metrics are all over the place. FRAA, DRS, and UZR loved him in 186 innings in 2017, and hated him in 287 innings lat year. The eye test isn’t friendly, though, so I think that it’s likely that he is a negative defender at first. But, given the small sample sizes, I don’t really have a strong opinion on this.

And FRAA had Hicks at -8.6 last year, so they actually have him improving a bit. This one I just straight-up don’t buy, though. It doesn’t jibe with the eye test, and DRS and UZR both had him as average last year (and well above-average before that).

Rex asks: A die-hard Yankee fan since 1955, I’ve always used batting average,rbi’s, and home runs to gauge a players production. I lose interest in a story when terms like WAR,BABIP, and other analytics  are used…simply because I don’t understand them…and I would bet the grocery money that I am not alone in this! Would you please publish a list of these terms, and a short summary on why we should give a damn about them. I was in broadcast news 35 years and learned I should not assume that my audience knew what I knew about a topic.

We do have a glossary of the statistics that are frequently used around these parts, which you can find here.

Paul asks: Do you think teams may be waiting for spring training to sign free agents since they can move their injured players to the 60-day IL instead of having to DFA Fringe 40-man players?

I hadn’t considered this until reading this e-mail, but it wouldn’t surprise me if we see a mild flurry of activity once the 60-day injured list opens for business. Flurry may be too strong a word, considering that there may not be all that many players that will hit the injured list – but, given the preciousness of 40-man roster spots, it could help out some of the lower-level free agents that are looking for a gig with a real shot at playing time.

Mike asks: I’m just trying to find a positive in the Yankees not signing Harper. Do you think they’re passing so they can  sign Trout instead?

Sure. And then they’ll pass on him to sign Francisco Lindor the next off-season. And then they’ll pass on Lindor to sign Alex Bregman the following year.

Any claims that the Yankees are passing on ‘x’ now to sign ‘y’ later are disingenuous at best; or, if it’s a legitimate strategy, foolish. Counting on players to retain their skill level, stay healthy, and not sign an extension is a recipe for disaster – especially when it comes at the cost of a better chance of winning now.

John asks: The farm system rankings are confusing me. Experts are ranking the Yankees system in the bottom half of the league (19 by Law and you agreed on your chat). However from reading you and those same other sources, very few teams have this many uber talented 17-19 year old players. Even Keith Law says that players like Pereira are poised to jump into the top 100 this year. No one would be surprised if Cabello (still don’t get how people compare him to Vlad and Soto and don’t rate him higher), Pereira, Deivi, Freicer Perez, Roansy Contreras, Seigler, and a bunch more prospects shot up prospect lists. Most teams would rather have star potential then a bunch of solid players. Granted most will miss but there are so many talented young players, that some will break out. I don’t expect the Yankees to have a top 10 system with only 2 or 3 top 100 prospects, but I find it hard to believe there are 18 other baseball systems that I would rather have then the Yankees. Am I missing something?

I think you answered your own questions without really knowing it – the vast majority of their big-time potential stars are teenagers that have not yet sniffed the upper minors, meaning their risk factors are higher. Injuries don’t help, either. With that in mind, take a look at their top-ten prospects:

1. Estevan Florial – missed two months last season; has yet to reach Double-A
2. Jonathan Loaisiga – has thrown just 184.1 IP in six seasons; missed a month with shoulder soreness last year
3. Anthony Seigler – 19-years-old; 2018 draft pick; may not reach full-season ball this year
4. Everson Pereira – 17-years-old; has yet to play full-season ball
5. Antonio Cabello – 18-years-old; has yet to play full-season ball
6. Deivi Garcia – 19-years-old; one start above High-A
7. Roansy Contreras – 19-years-old; has yet to play full-season ball
8. Albert Abreu – has battled injuries (including elbow inflammation) in each of the last two years
9. Mike King – probably MLB-ready
10. Luis Medina – 19-years-old; has yet to play full-season ball

Is there a hell of a lot of talent here? Absolutely. But eight of those guys are pretty far from the majors, and one of the two that’s knocking on the door has never been healthy for a full season. That makes for what might just be the highest-risk, highest-reward farm system around – but the beta is tremendous.

Adam asks: 12-ptch roster limit. I, too, am not in favor of this proposed rule change. Assuming this winds up getting approved, do you think there’s a way to game the system i.e., label a pitcher as a “position player” under the pretense of using him as a bench bat and then subsequently bring that “position player” in as a pitcher? After all, position players do pitch here and then. Or would MLB just deem this to be blatant circumvention of the rule?

There’s no way MLB would let this fly. I’m assuming that the team will have to name their pitchers in advance of the game (or whenever they adjust their roster), and only those designated as pitchers will be able to head to the mound. The wrinkle, of course, is someone like Shohei Ohtani, who might require the changes to the roster to be game-by-game.

Tim asks: The question I’ve been asking myself during the whole Machado/Harper discussion is this: how great is the incremental improvement to the team from one superstar, versus the opportunity cost of spending the money in the future when a more dire need is evident. It’s clear that the team is now adhering to a budget of sorts. Who doesn’t want a superstar, but if the choice is to sign Machado now and have the offense get marginally better (ok, and the defense much better), or be able to trade for a couple of key players in July because of injuries, I know which way I’d go.  Same thing for signing free agents next winter and all the future off seasons.  I’d rather the money was spent on a CC replacement, not improving the offense.  Does that make sense or am I ignorant on some of the financial implications?

What you’re saying definitely makes sense, there’s just a great deal of nuance in there.

Signing a player now gives you that added value for the entirety of the season. The difference between (hypothetically) the current set-up – Andujar at 3B, Gardner in LF, and Stanton at DH – and a Machado-based set-up – Machado at 3B, Stanton in LF, Andujar at DH, and Gardner as the fourth outfielder – adds a ton of value throughout the season. You’re essentially replacing Gardner with Machado in this instance, while also improving the bench.

I do agree that I would’ve rather spent money on a larger rotation upgrade than Happ, but the Yankees balked at Corbin’s price tag, and there wasn’t really a better option at that point. There’s always an opportunity cost to passing on someone or waiting to see who becomes available, and they have paid some semblance of a price as a result. And, for whatever it’s worth, I’m not sure that I loved Corbin at that price, either.

You also have to make the best of whatever is available. Would a rotation upgrade be better? Perhaps. But when there’s generational talent available on the position player side of things, adding two or three wins there instead of overpaying for a marginal rotation upgrade makes sense.

And, getting to the core of your question, I don’t like putting off something today on the off-chance that you can get something better tomorrow. Putting the best possible product on the field on Opening Day inherently has more value than waiting for a weakness to develop and tackling it in-season. The costs will be higher, and that’s assuming that there’s a solution on the market. Besides, signing Machado or Harper now shouldn’t mean that they can’t trade for a reliever or fifth starter on July 31 – they just cost money, after all.

Their budget is another wrinkle altogether. But we can’t anticipate what their needs might be in July, and waiting to see what happens seems like a recipe for disaster.

Austin asks: How many first round picks have really panned out? I completely agree that the system is broken, and needs to be corrected in many ways, but how many first rounders really have a good career? I can’t imagine its that many. It’s really hard to play in the major league. The numbers probably say he doesn’t have a good chance. 

Kyler Murray was the 9th overall pick. As per Baseball-Reference, 34 of the 54 9th overall picks reached the majors, and combined to produce 269.3 WAR (or 7.9 per big leaguer). And that list includes several quality players, including Javier Baez, Kevin Appier, Barry Zito, Geoff Jenkins, Mark Kotsay, Ron Darling, John Danks, and Michael Cuddyer. Appier was the only truly great player on that list (though, Baez appears to be on his way), but that’s not an insignificant number of solid major leaguers. And that’s just from the slot in which Murray was drafted.

Let’s take a look at how the first round picks from 1998 to 2007 worked out:

1998 – 69% reached the Majors and produced an average of 10.3 WAR
1999 – 47% reached the Majors and produced an average of 9.2 WAR
2000 – 57% reached the Majors and produced an average of 7.5 WAR
2001 – 59% reached the Majors and produced an average of 8.7 WAR
2002 – 65% reached the Majors and produced an average of 12.7 WAR
2003 – 72% reached the Majors and produced an average of 7.6 WAR
2004 – 82% reached the Majors and produced an average of 7.0 WAR
2005 – 77% reached the Majors and produced an average of 10.9 WAR
2006 – 75% reached the Majors and produced an average of 8.3 WAR
2007 – 65% reached the Majors and produced an average of 6.4 WAR

That’s a ten-year sample wherein roughly 67% of first-rounders reached the big leagues, and produced an average of 8.9 WAR. That may not sound like much, but there are diminishing returns with each and every round. Moreover, 8.9 WAR really isn’t a bad mark for one’s career. And while that may not mean that a player is a lock to reach the show or be much more than a bench player or reliever when they get there, that group nevertheless has he best chance of reaching those not-so-lofty heights.

Bill asks: There’s been talk of Collusion between owners, i know it’s almost impossible to prove BUT if it was proven that the owners colluded to drive down FA prices, what could the consequences possibly be for them? 

The owners have been found guilty of collusion three times before, all in the 1980s. They ended up settling those suits and paying the MLBPA a $280 MM settlement, which the union decided how to distribute to its members. Players that had signed below-market deals were also allowed to field new contract offers in some cases (though that was fairly limited), without having to lose their current deal. I suspect that we’d see something similar this time around – albeit with a much larger dollar figure.

Happy new year, folks! It’s the first mailbag of 2019, and I’m pinch-hitting for Mike – and I have nine questions to work with. As always, you can send your questions to RABmailbag (at) gmail (dot) com.

Tony asks: Your post about Gray still being on the team, wherein you noted that he’s an ace away from YS, made me wonder. Could they keep him and limit him to road-only starts? I mean…we play 81 games away from YS, so how many hoops would the rotation have to jump through to make sure that Sonny got most (say 25) starts on the road?

In a vacuum, this makes sense. It’s an extreme version of teams benching their lefties against Chris Sale, or not wanting to start fly-ball heavy righties in Yankee Stadium. And, given that it makes sense to get more rest for all of their starting pitchers. I’m not a staunch proponent of six-man rotations, but I think they make sense in certain settings.

All that being said, having a road-only starter would be incredibly difficult to manage. The Yankees open the season on a six-game home stand, and then play nine in a row at home from April 12 through April 21. Gray is essentially worthless in that time, which means you’d be wasting a roster spot; and that’s a precious commodity in these bullpen-heavy times. That undoubtedly evens out over the course of the season, but it’s nevertheless a hurdle to consider. Moreover, a quick review of the schedule shows that he’d be deployed erratically, and starters are creatures of habit – I don’t know what sort of impact pitching on drastically different amounts of rest would have. And all of this ignores the impact on the other starters (including making them all have a disproportionately higher number of starts in Yankee Stadium).

I do think there’s something to be said for trying to set Gray up to pitch mostly on the road, in the event that they do hold onto him. That’s far more doable. And yet the same issues remain.

Mark asks: I know it has been said that Andujar or Sanchez would be just an average hitting first basemen, but wouldn’t they be better than the .220 batting average we expect our existing first bases options to give us? Would there really be anyone else that could give the Yankees that kind of WAR for league minimum?

This is a two-layer problem.

The first question is whether the Yankees can find a cheap first baseman that’s a better option than Luke Voit and Greg Bird. The answer to that is almost certainly yes. Matt Adams ($4 MM) and Justin Bour ($2.5 M) signed for relatively little, and both would be massive upgrades over what the team has grown accustomed to at first. Is that the minimum? No – but it’s not a big-time outlay, either. Matt Davidson, Derek Dietrich, Lucas Duda, Wilmer Flores, and Mark Reynolds are all free agents, and all profile as average or better hitters. And I doubt that any of them will cost more than Adams.

The second question is more complex: if the Yankees move Andujar or Sanchez to first, who are they being replaced with at third or catcher? If it’s Manny Machado, then I’d absolutely be happy with Andujar shifting to first. Beyond him, though, things get hazy. Marwin Gonzalez isn’t a good defensive third baseman, either, and Jed Lowrie hasn’t played there regularly in a few years. I don’t think you move Andujar for either of them. As for catcher, if you’re not signing Yasmani Grandal, giving up a draft pick, and going over the tax, then what’s the point?

Basically, it’s a matter of first base being relatively easy to fill on the cheap, and the Yankees seemingly more than happy to stick with their in-house options.

Roy asks: As I read your article on trading Andujar to the Padres for prospects, it got me thinking about how little the Yankees currently have to offer at the July 31st trade deadline.  Beyond Bumgarner, who is likely to be prized at the deadline.  In other words, who do you predict to be tanking then that is not tanking now, and who do they offer for prospects?

This may not be the best methodology, but here are the players that (1) play for teams that might not contend, (2) will be free agents after 2019, and (3) could end up in high-demand:

• Jose Abreu, White Sox
• Nolan Arenado, Rockies
• Jake Arrieta, Phillies
• Francisco Cervelli, Pirates
• Khris Davis, A’s
• Josh Donaldson, Braves
• Todd Frazier, Mets
• Scooter Gennett, Reds
• Ivan Nova, Pirates
• Yasiel Puig, Reds
• Zack Wheeler, Mets
• Alex Wood, Reds

I’m leaving off a slew of relievers, given the volatility and fungibility of bullpen arms … as well as the fact that it would make the list incredibly cumbersome. Bumgarner is almost certainly the prize arm available, but there are several bats and arms that could make a difference for a team down the stretch.

As for what the Yankees can offer: it’s difficult to say. A great deal can change with prospects in the span of a couple of months. If Estevan Florial rakes at Double-A, he could end up in high-demand; if Jonathan Loaisiga ends up on the disabled list again, he could be persona non grata. That being said, they do lack a clear-cut, top-flight prospect to shop as of now, so the likelihood of them winning a bidding war for Arenado or Bumgarner or whoever doesn’t feel too high at this time. But that can change in a hurry.

Michael asks: Do you think there is any chance we could pry Travis Shaw from the Brewers? His lefty swing would profile well here. Brew Crew do not seem fully committed to him after trading for Moose and Schoop last year, as well as moving him all over the diamond and even sitting him vs. lefties down the stretch. He’d be good a fit here as our 1B. They have reported interest in Gray, and I know they’d need more in return. However, could there be a logical fit?

I don’t think that the Brewers machinations had anything to do with Shaw. Second base was a black hole for them on both offense and defense, and they felt that having Moustakas at third and Shaw at second was the best solution to that problem. I’d hazard that says more about their faith in Shaw to move to a more difficult defensive position than anything else, in fact. And Schoop was added as a replacement for utility player Hernan Perez; he ended up playing about a third of his games at short, after all. Schoop was the one who ended up falling out of favor, riding the pine frequently and starting just one playoff game.

As for Shaw: I think he’s a great fit on the Yankees. He has hit .258/.347/.497 (119 wRC+) with strong walk (11.6%) and strikeout (20.6%) rates as a full-time player over the last two years, and he’s still a few months shy of 29. His walk and strikeout rates have improved every year, too. Shaw might be a platoon player, given his 89 wRC+ against lefties – but he’s not unplayable. And he’s a solid defender at first and third, and didn’t embarrass himself at second.

If Gray and a mid-level prospect or two could get it done, I’d be all for it. Given that he has three years of team control remaining, however, I think he’d cost a fair bit more than that. And my trade proposal sucks too much to put something else together.

Jeremy asks: I feel like we’re all forgetting how miserable it was being saddled with huge contracts on the downside of their careers: Giambi, A-Rod, Jeter, Teixeira, CC before his big contract expired, currently Ellsbury, and probably a lot of other guys I’m forgetting. I get that the Yankees limiting their spending is annoying, but isn’t there something to be said for financial prudence and finding the right value? Especially in a sport where the playoffs are such a “crapshoot,” do we really want to mortgage the future for win-now signings that will likely look awful in a few years?

Bryce Harper will be 26 for the entirety of the 2019 season, and Machado will turn 27 in July. Compare that to the ages at which the other guys signed:

• Giambi – 31
• Rodriguez – 32
• Jeter – 37*
• Teixeira – 29
• Sabathia – 28 (or 31 when he signed the extension)
• Ellsbury – 30

I put an asterisk on Jeter because I don’t know if you’re talking about his free agency, or when he signed his ten-year extension. If it’s the latter, it’s worth noting that he was awesome for all but the final year of that deal.

Harper and Machado are so much younger than these guys that it doesn’t make much sense to compare them. And that’s why they’re such desirable commodities – they’re way younger than most players are when they hit free agency. A ten-year deal for Harper would pay him from age-26 through age-35 and, for whatever it’s worth, most of the players that you mentioned were still quite good into their mid-30s. I think the odds are in favor of Harper and Machado more than earning their keep for the vast majority of their contracts.

I also don’t think that signing a long-term deal is akin to mortgaging the future. Dealing away a slew of prospects for a player? Sure. That’s mortgaging the future a bit. But paying only money for a young, elite player that should give you dynamite returns for several years sets you up incredibly well now and in the future.

Colin asks: Doesn’t it make sense that the Yanks are holding onto Sonny to see what happens with Machado, if they sign him, they trade Sonny for minor leaguers and unload salary to lighten the luxury tax hit, if they don’t sign Machado they use Sonny to get a more meaningful major league piece (e.g. as part of a Scooter trade)?  Not saying I like it, but wouldn’t it make sense, and then the Sonny deal would go down right after Machado says where he is going?

I’ve suspected this for a few weeks now. And, in a vacuum, it makes sense. With Machado in-play, Gray can be dealt for salary relief and depth or prospects; without Machado, he could be exchanged for a piece that fits this year’s roster. My issue with it is that there’s a big-time opportunity cost that comes with playing the waiting game. Gray for Gennett has been kicked around on Yankees Twitter for some time now, but the Reds already traded for Tanner Roark and Alex Wood, and appear to be going for it in the NL Central – would they really give up their starting second baseman for another pitcher? I don’t know.

Trevor asks: When looking at partnering with SD I wonder how a swap of Wil Myers and Ellsbury would factor in.  I’d guess that Myers has $30 mil or so of negative value.  Ells has no value and its all dead money (though a team like SD may like to stash him to cash in on the insurance policy). Myers could provide a bat that is semi-capable of 1b, 3b, LF, and RF while lowering the AAV from the Ellsbury contract by about $8 mil a year.  I know our trade proposals suck…  I’m asking more about the theory.  While it is ideal to get player value from an asset like Andujar but offsetting some of it by getting Myers at a lower AAV could potentially help bridge the gap.  I hate to even venture a trade idea but off the top of my head I’d be interested in a Ellsbury and Andujar for Myers, Francisco Mejia and Jose Castillo.

I’m going to handle this in two parts.

I’m semi-interested in Myers as a buy-low candidate. His luxury tax hit is only $12 MM per year, which isn’t bad at all, and he has the sort of power that plays everywhere. And, while I don’t think his numbers with the Padres are necessarily an illusion, it’s worth noting that his exit velocity (89.7 MPH), barrel percentage (8.2%), and hard hit percentage (45.3%) over the last two years are comfortably above league-average. There might be something there. Is it enough of that nebulous something to make me confident he’s an upgrade at first? I’m not sure. I would prefer him to Ellsbury, though.

The second part then becomes whether I would deal Andujar for Mejia, Castillo, and what amounts to cash. And, to be honest, I’m not sure that’s actually worth considering, because I don’t see the Padres doing it. Andujar is a very good to great hitter that will probably end up at first base for them, whereas Mejia is a good to very good hitter than can catch (and has an extra year of team control); and Castillo profiles as a legit closer. I don’t see the Padres being the team that takes on salary to facilitate a trade like this.

Would I do it, though? I’d consider it, to be sure. I’m not opposed to having two quality catchers on the roster, and rotating them between backstop and DH to keep both fresh. And I’m a big fan of Mejia, to boot. I just don’t think it’s terribly likely.

Alexis asks: My TPS but what about Dee Gordon as Didi replacement or bench player (he can play SS, 2B and CF) and Mike Leake (as sixth starter/swing man) as insurance for our starts?  Can we swap Ellsbury 42 million contract plus middle level prospects/MLB ready ones (like Wade, German and Acevedo for example) for Leake 31 million and Gordon 26.5 million contracts? Mariners will actually reduce their payroll by 7.6 million per year in 19 and 20.  Who will said no Yankees or Mariners?

This would be a hard no for me – and I assume the Yankees. Gordon is versatile in the same way that any player who plays multiple positions is, in that he has stood at various spots over the years. However, he did not look good in center last year, and he’s never been a quality shortstop. So, in essence, you’re looking at a second-baseman that has an 84 wRC+ over the last three years and, by Statcast’s sprint speed metric, has slowed down in back-to-back-to-back seasons.

And I’m not interested in Leake, either. A righty with an 89 MPH fastball that doesn’t strike anyone out? In Yankee Stadium? No thanks. I’d rather hold onto Gray for that role than take a flier on someone like Leake.

JDK asks: Re: Machado/Harper – Wouldn’t 10/$35 be a better deal for the players and the Yankees than 8/$40?

I don’t think that there’s a right or wrong answer to this.

The time value of money, in a nutshell, tells us that money now is better than money later. Having an extra $5 MM per year for eight years may well be more valuable than having $70 MM (or a net of $30 MM) more between years nine and ten. It also provides an opportunity to make more money at age-34, as opposed to age-36. It’s not a simple economics problem, to be sure, but there’s definitely a great deal of value in having more money today than tomorrow. I don’t think that players see it this way in most sports, though, as years seem to win out more often than not.

As for the team, the seemingly obvious answer is that the lower AAV is preferable, given the luxury tax issues (and general availability of more money today to spend on someone else). However, there are inherent risks that increase with age that they would have to navigate once the player hits his mid-30s. Moreover, the impact of having potentially dead money – as they do with Ellsbury now – increases with every additional year of the contract.

Please accept this non-answer as an answer.